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RESPONSE
VIRTUE AND RIGHTS IN AMERICAN
PROPERTY LAW
Eric R. Claey4

INTRODUCTION: ON VIRTUE AND FRYING PANS

In Plato's Republic, Socrates persuades his conversationalists to
help him construct a city organized around commerce. Glaucon, who
has an idealist streak, dismisses this city as a "city of pigs."1 In response, Socrates sketches for Glaucon an ideal city ruled by the most
virtuous citizens-the philosophers. 2 To make the city as just and harmonious as possible, the philosophers abolish the institution of private property. They require the auxiliary citizens to use external
3
assets only in cooperation, to contribute to common civic projects.
This conversational thread presents a tension that is simply unsolvable in practical politics in any permanent way. Politics focuses to
an important extent on low and uncontroversial ends, most of which
are associated with comfortable self-preservation. "Property" is the
most powerful legal metaphor for these ends. But if politics is only
about property, it seems materialistic, lacking a proper respect for the
peaks of human excellence. 'Justice" may be understood to strive for
such peaks; "virtues" by definition aim for them. Yet a politics of virt Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. This Response was presented at a George Mason University School of Law Levy Workshop on Law
and Liberty and at the fall 2008 Georgetown-Syracuse Property, Citizenship, and Social
Entrepreneurism colloquium. I thank Ross Davies, Jim Ely, Michael Krauss, Nelson Lund,
Eric Miller, Robert Miller, Andy Morriss, Adam Mossoff, David Schleicher, Michael Shapiro, Larry Solum, Lee Strang, and Katrina Wyman for helpful comments and criticisms.
I offer special thanks, for assistance above and beyond the call, to Brendan Mahan,
Matt Savoie, Naushin Shibli, Lindsay Strauss, and the other editors who edited this Response. No law review editor could possibly edit solely for the good consequences that
would follow. The Cornell Law Review staff's editing work exemplified virtue practiced for
its own sake.
1

PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 372d4-5 [hereinafter REPUBLIC]; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF

PLATO 49 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter REPUBLIC (Bloom trans.)]. Bloom
translates the Greek term hy6n as "sows"; "pigs" is a more common translation. For Socrates' sketch of the city of comfortable preservation, see REPUBuc, supra, at 369b5-372d2;
REPUBLIC (Bloom trans.), supra at 46-49.
2
See REPUBLIC, supra note 1, at 428e2-429a4; REPUBLIC (Bloom trans.), supra note 1,

at 107.
3

See REPUBLIC, supra note 1, at 464b8-465e2; REPUBLIC (Bloom trans.), supra note 1,

at 143-45.
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tue and justice can easily devour property. In its commonsensical understanding, after all, property consists of dominion-a domain of
freedom to decide how to apply the object of ownership to his own
life plans, independent of direction from philosopher-kings or anyone
else. When property is an owner's right to use his own as a philosopher thinks most likely to bring out his excellence, it is not property
anymore. The contrast between the city of pigs and the city of justice
forces readers to choose between comfortable self-preservation and
virtue. At a more primal level, it also forces everyone-that is, anyone
who is not a philosopher-king-to choose between an attachment to
perfectjustice and a selfish desire to enjoy his own without being governed by anyone else. Most theories of politics muddle between these
two extremes.
This conversational thread leapt to my mind when I first read the
lead articles in this Issue. The implications raised by this thread present some of the most fundamental issues in political philosophy and
modernity. Legal scholarship operates far more often down among
the trees than over such vast forests, and I am grateful to Professors
Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Pefialver for opening legal scholarship up to these themes.
The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property Law ("The Social-Obligation Norm," for short, by Alexander) 4 and Land Virtues (by
Pefialver) also deserve a considerable amount of praise. Both introduce to property scholarship a general approach to practical philosophy I find quite sensible, even if Alexander and Pefialver apply that
school differently from the manner in which I do. Both use that approach to push back against economic analysis of property, for reasons that I may not necessarily endorse but with which I sympathize.
In the process, however, The Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues
may encourage lawyers and scholars to leap out of an economic frying
pan into a political-philosophy fire.
Let me restate my reactions more systematically. First, to an extent, The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues both suggest to some
extent that one family of philosophical theories can explain descriptively and justify normatively features of American property law that
economic analysis cannot explain as effectively. I avoid these economic comparisons as much as I can in this Response.
Instead, I focus on the prior question whether the philosophical
theories discussed in The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues make
significant contributions to legal philosophy. They do. Both articles
mine virtue ethics for their proverbial pay dirt in American property
4

Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property Law, 94 CoR-

NELL L. REv. 745 (2009).

5

Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).
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law. The genus of "virtue ethics" theories belongs to a family of approaches to practical philosophy I will call here "virtue-friendly" theories of practical action. As used here, "virtue-friendly" theories refer
to a broad range of theories of practical philosophy that all place high
priority on virtue and on happiness, which in turn is understood as a
reflective state of character that disposes an actor to deploy his reason,
to regulate his passions, in pursuit of the most meaningful sources of
satisfaction possible. This family includes the practical theory of Aristotle, many natural-law theories from the medieval and early Enlightenment periods, and contemporary virtue ethics.
Virtue-friendly theories start from a wide range of metaethical
starting assumptions, and they differ about how happiness, reason,
passions, conscience, and virtues all relate to one another. Even so,
virtue-friendly theories have important commonalities, and they have
not received the attention they deserve in property scholarship. Virtue-friendly philosophical theories informed Anglo-American and
Continental law in their formative years. Equally important, such theories also anticipate and finesse important criticisms associated particularly with contemporary Kantian deontological practical philosophy.
The Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues both belong in this loose
family of virtue-friendly theories, and both illustrate how virtuefriendly theories avoid one of the biggest problems associated with
Kantian philosophy. Both articles therefore significantly advance
practical philosophy in law.
Finally, The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues are even more
original because they put front and center a question that follows
straightforwardly from the thread of The Republic with which I began:
Does a theory of virtue require a system of political rights and private
law organized around virtue, or can a theory of virtue be reconciled
with a politics and private law of rights? This question has been surprisingly neglected-not only in American private-law scholarship but
also in virtue ethics scholarship. Although The Social-Obligation Norm
and Land Virtues take no final position on the tension between virtue
and rights, both seem fairly optimistic that theories of virtue can justify legal regimes organized around the pursuit of virtue.
I think the legal system does have, and may tolerate, a little virtuecentric regulation. Yet, there are also important reasons to be pessimistic that a legal system can remain humane while promoting actively "virtue" or some of the virtues. The concept of "virtue"
establishes a hierarchy for practical action. Any theory that places
high operational priority on virtue has a built-in tendency to encourage actors to prefer the highest and most demanding virtues over
common-denominator virtues. That tendency is fairly innocuous in
ethics, where individual actors can decide for themselves how willing
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or able they are to perfect themselves. The same tendency, however,
challenges law and politics to their foundations. In those domains,
competing religious, ethnic, or partisan factions find it hard to resist
the temptation to use virtue theory as an ideological tool, to establish
hegemony over rival factions in their local communities.
This problem led early Enlightenment theorists to try to banish
"virtue" as a dominant category in political theory. "Property" is a
dominant theme in American law and politics because it serves as a
metaphor for liberalism-a political regime organized around rights,
to keep off-limits from the government the power to compel citizens
to follow any one contestable theory of virtue. Now, rights-based political theory does not totally banish virtue. But liberal political orders
deal with virtue regulation very carefully. When such orders promote
virtues, they promote the least controversial and most encompassing
virtues: patriotism, civility, sexual restraint, or industry. Moreover,
when they promote such virtues, liberal political orders generally refrain from promoting virtue for virtue's sake; instead, they claim that
citizens' rights cannot be secure unless citizens are virtuous enough to
respect one another's rights freely.
Although I am enthusiastic about many aspects of The Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues, it gives me great pause that both articles
tout virtue theories so enthusiastically without considering this historical and political context. By promoting virtue theories so unabashedly in the details of property law, The Social-ObligationNorm and
Land Virtues threaten the role that "property" plays as a political metaphor in liberal political orders. Of course, many of the specific prescriptions of The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues do not reopen
the problems that led to the Enlightenment. But a few do. In any
case, readers who are interested in The Social-ObligationNorm and Land
Virtues (as they should be) should pause to consider why virtue theory
might apply straightforwardly in ethics but then backfire in property
law.
I
VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE DEONTOLOGY

A.

TRAP

Law, Philosophy, and Social Science

Because the issues I am raising seem pretty far afield from the
main intentions of The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues, let me
start from Alexander and Pefialver's point of departure and work outward. In property as elsewhere in private law, scholarship is influenced by a rivalry between social-science and humanistic approaches
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7
6
to scholarship. In its most pointed form, as Alexander and Pefialver
both recognize, this rivalry takes the form of a contest between economics and philosophy.8 I assume it is not controversial to say that
most scholars regard economics as having contributed more to our
understanding of property than philosophy. Fairly commonly, scholars claim that economic analysis now "reign[s] unchallenged as the
predominant theoretical mode of analysis in private law scholarship
and pedagogy." 9 It is not nearly so common for scholars to make similar claims about any sort of philosophy. 10
These perceptions shape a great deal of private-law philosophical
scholarship. In particular, they force philosophically interested scholarship to satisfy three different expectations. Two are obvious: Philosophically oriented legal theory must explain why the philosophy it is
using is internally coherent and philosophically plausible. It must also
explain descriptively and justify normatively features of legal doctrine
that a competent doctrinalist could not figure out for herself. The
third is comparative, and in some tension with the first two: A philosophical theory must add value that economic analysis does not already add. It is a tall order to respond to all three demands in one
article. But if an article as philosophically ambitious as The Social-Obligation Norm or Land Virtues does not try, some readers will ignore it for
not explaining the philosophy, while others will ignore it for not justifying itself in relation to the now-dominant interdisciplinary mode of
analysis.
The Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues both try to straddle
these competing expectations. The former focuses more on philosophical interpretation of the law, the latter more on philosophy's
payoff toward economics," but both articles address all three expectations. In this Response, I abstract as much as I can from Alexander
and Pefialver's comparative claims about economic analysis. I have
some general sympathy for their intentions, but I prefer in this Response to focus as much as I can on the philosophical issues. PhilosoSee Alexander, supra note 4, at 747-48, 750-51.
See Pefialver, supra note 5, at 832-60.
8
For one helpful overview, seeJulesL. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE LJ.
1511, 1514-20 (2003) (reviewing Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERsUS WA'ELFARE (2002)). Throughout this Response, I assume that "economic analysis" integrates explanation, normative prescriptions, and underlying practical philosophy in a manner
similar to that in which theories of practical philosophy do. That assumption may seem a
category mistake to many readers, but it would be too distracting for me to question the
assumption here.
9 Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication:A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REv. 287, 357 (2007).
10 For dissenting opinions, considerJULEs L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN
DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 1-63 (2001); STEPHEN A. SMITH,
CO,',rRAcr THEORY 14-31 (2004).
11 See Pefialver, supra note 5, at 860-86.
6

7
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phers are more likely than we lawyers to pore over what Blackstone
called "dispute[s] that savour[ ] too much of nice and scholastic refinement."1 2 Although it is inevitable that we lawyers be more practical than philosophers, we should also anticipate the questions that
philosophers will ask when we draw on philosophical sources. In this
Part, I hope to help The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues anticipate philosophical criticisms I have encountered in similar scholar3
ship of my own.'
B.

Deontology Versus Consequentialism

The philosophical aspects of Alexander's and Pefialver's articles
deserve careful study and emulation. Both anticipate a complaint,
about one prominent version of deontology, that leads many non-philosophical scholars to brush aside casually philosophical legal
scholarship.
Until fairly recently, most normative scholarship on practical philosophy 14 could be sorted out into two competing camps-"deontology" and "consequentialism." "Deontological" practical theories focus
primarily on a practical actor's obligation or duty. If deontology were
to be reduced to a couple of slogans, one would be, "[W] hat makes a
choice right is its conformity with a moral norm," and the other would
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8.
See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural PropertyRights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), manuscript at 3-4 (George
Mason Univ. Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.
12

13

com/abstract=1 117999.
14 This response uses the term "practical philosophy" to describe philosophical inquiry studying human action and its proper ends and constraints. (For another example
of this usage, see Stephen Buckle, Aristotle's Republic or, Why Aristotle's Ethics Is Not Virtue
Ethics, 77 PHIL. 565, 575 (2002).) As used here, "practical philosophy" encompasses "ethical philosophy," the inquiry into individual human action, and "political philosophy," the
inquiry into human action by groups organized into cities, nations, and other political
communities. The term excludes conceptual philosophy and philosophical investigation
into nonhuman phenomena. Most other forms of philosophy are devoted solely to understanding phenomena; practical philosophy makes primary the question of how humans
ought to live and act. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 11.2, at 1103b26-32 [hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS]; ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 23 (Joe Sachs trans., 2002)
[hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Sachs trans.)].
"Moral" philosophy might be a more fitting term for the subject matter considered
here. This Response will use "moral" when absolutely necessary to do so as a synonym for
"applying a general metaethics and philosophical approach to a practical situation" but will
avoid its use otherwise. Some scholars equate "moral" with "ethical" so that it excludes the
"political." In addition, for many readers, the term "moral" presumes the "law conception
of ethics" that G.E.M. Anscombe deplored and sought to overcome by the recovery of
virtue ethics. G.E.M. Anscombe, Mode-n Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1, 5 (1958). In that
light, the term "moral" has some built-in tendency in favor of deontological and against
consequentialist theories of practical action. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Morality, The PeculiarInstitution, in VIRTUE ETHICS 45, 48-49 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997) (contrasting utilitarianism with deontology by calling the former "a marginal member of the
morality system" and the latter the "central . .. version of morality").
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be, "[S] ome choices cannot be justified by their effects-that no matter how morally good their consequences, some choices are morally
forbidden. 1 5 More technically, a theory is deontological if it judges
the morality of a choice primarily by whether it conforms to a moral
norm and not primarily by whether the choice leads to good conse6
quences. The Right, so to speak, takes priority over the Good.1
"Consequentialist" theories reverse the relationship between the
norm and its consequences. Consequentialists "hold that choicesacts and/or intentions-are to be morally assessed solely by the states
of affairs they bring about.' 1 7 Consequentialists must identify some
conception of "the Good," that is, "states of affairs that are intrinsically
valuable"; consequentalist ethical theories then encourage "whatever
8
choices increase the Good."'
Like many classifications, the deontology-consequentialism divide
is subject to many qualifications and misunderstandings. 19 For example, unless "deontology" and "consequentialism" are defined precisely, they do not state mutually exclusive alternatives, as "nonconsequentialism" and "consequentialism" do. "Deontology" may be
understood fairly broadly, to cover approaches holding that moral
norms are not solely reducible to good consequences. It may be understood more narrowly (as this Response does), to cover approaches
that stress moral norms derived largely without considering consequences. 20 It may also be understood extremely narrowly, to refer
only to theories of practical philosophy closely associated with Immanuel Kant. 2 1 Similarly, some philosophers use "consequentialism" to re15

Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, DeontologicalEthics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA

Or PHILOsoPI § 2 (Winter 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/
ethics-deontological.
16
See id.; Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, Introduction, in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 14, at
1, 1-2; Robert B. Louden, Toward a Genealogy of 'Deontology,'34J.HIST. PHIL. 571 (1996);
Gregory Trianosky, What Is Virtue Ethics All About?, 27 Am. PHIL. Q. 335, 338 (1990).
17
Alexander & Moore, supra note 15, § 1.
18

Id.

19 See, e.g., ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 37-38 (1999) (identifying "inadequacy in the slogan 'Utilitarianism begins with the Good, deontology with the Right'")
(emphasis added); Trianosky, supra note 16, at 335 (listing nine tenets of "neo-Kantianism"
and warning that these tenets are "not necessarily Kant's own view" and are not always
.uniformly understood or carefully distinguished by [their] adversaries").
20
Consider Michael S. Moore's usage in Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the Borders of
ConsequentialistJustifications:The Scope of Agent-Relative Restrictions, 27 LAW & PHIL. 35 passim
(2007).
21
See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 401, at 17 (Lewis
White Beck trans., Macmillan Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1990) (1785) ("Thus the moral worth of an
action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it or in any principle of action
which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects.., could be
brought about through other causes and would not require the will of a rational being,
while the highest and unconditional good can be found only in such a will."). Here and
subsequently, the first page citation refers to Kant's original pagination (which Beck provides in the margins), the second to the translation in the Beck edition.
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fer broadly to any school of practical thought that prioritizes the Good
over the Right. (This Response employs that usage.) Others, however, assume that "consequentialism" refers specifically to its "paradigm case," welfare-maximizing act utilitarianism as set forth by
22
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, and others.
Notwithstanding these subtleties and many others, legal scholars
continue to use "deontology" and "consequentialism" coarsely as opposites. They also tend to assume that most or all "deontological" theories are Kantian, that most or all "consequentialist" theories closely
resemble welfare-maximizing act utilitarianism, and that the consequentialism-versus-deontology divide is foundational. For example, in
Fairness Versus Welfare, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell posit a spectrum of possible justifications for government actions running from
the pure consequentialism of welfare economics to a "pure principle
23
of fairness" grounded in deontological Kantian ethics.
Separately (and again making all necessary qualifications for
broad generalizations), legal scholarship has tended to map the economics-versus-philosophy divide 24 in law onto the consequentialismversus-deontology divide in practical philosophy. For example, prominent political philosophy built on deontological rights claims-especially John Rawls's A Theory of Justice on one hand 25 and Robert
Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia on the other. 26 Leading philosoph27
ical tort scholarship appeals to Kantian claims of right and fairness.
Legal scholars therefore conclude, at least as a convenient first approximation, that philosophical claims of rights or fairness must be
grounded in deontology (usually some variation on Kantian deontology) if they are going to remain philosophical at all.
To illustrate, consider the debate associated with Fairness Versus
Welfare. Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge that many legal policy analysts "hold mixed normative views," in which deontological norms im28
pose side constraints on consequentialist policy analysis or vice versa.
After making this qualification, however, Kaplow and Shavell assume
22

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOS-

oPHY §§ 1, 3 (rev. ed. Spring 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/

consequentialism

(citingJEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(1789);JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETH-

ics (1874)); accord Justin Oakley, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 9 RATIO 128, 143 (1996).
23 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 8; see also id. at 16-38; accord LIAM MURPHY &
THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 42 (2002) (assuming and applying the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories of action).

24

And, more generally, the social science-versus-humanities divide.

25
26

SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23-32 (1971).
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-33, 300-04 (1974).

27

See, e.g., ARTHUR ,IPSTEIN, EQUALrrY, RPSPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAw 4 (1999); ERNEST

J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRPIVATE LAw 84-113 (1995).
28
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 43.
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that "notions of fairness [are] principles used in normative analysis
such that at least some weight is given to factors that are independent of
individuals' well-being."29 In other words, philosophy's job is to limit
welfare maximization with deontological side constraints that have no
direct connection to "individual well-being." Jules Coleman has criticized Fairness Versus Welfare, but in doing so he has accepted the basic
divisions Kaplow and Shavell posit between deontology and consequentialism. When Coleman classifies the various likely reader groups
in the book's audience, he distinguishes among "the fellow travelers
along the law-and-economics highway," "the uncommitted law professor," and "the deontologists-philosophers and legal theorists committed to the idea that some or other deontic considerations must
play an independent role in assessing legal practice as well as calls for
30
its reform."
C.

The Deontology Trap

Deontological practical theory has also come in for considerable
criticism. Many varieties of deontology, especially Kantian ones, make
practical prescriptions while abstracting away from the seediness and
disorderliness that human passions inject into human behavior. Because deontological theories elevate the Right over the Good, they
have at least some built-in tendency to make secondary the anthropological and psychological analyses that make human behavior determinate and intelligible. Specialists in virtue ethics often give pride of
place to G.E.M. Anscombe, 3 1 and particularly to a 1958 essay Anscombe wrote to call attention to several dead ends in which she be32
lieved contemporaneous ethical scholarship to be then stuck.
Anscombe dismissed Kantian ethics based on "universalizable maxims
[as] useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant
description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about
3 3
it."
In a similar survey of post-1800 ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre criticized Kant for making "the autonomy of ethics . .. logically independent of any assertions about human nature"; by contrast, he praised
Hume and Aristotle for seeking "to preserve morality as something
psychologically intelligible."3 4 Modern political theorists have lodged

29
30
31
32

Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
Coleman, supra note 8, at 1512.
See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 22, at 128.
Anscombe, supra note 14.

33

Id. at 2.

34

ALASDAIR MACIN'T'RE,

THE AGE

Hume on the 'Is' and the 'Ought,'inAGAINST
109, 124 (Univ. Notre Dame Press, 2d prtg. 1984) (1971).

THE SELF-IMAGES OF
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similar criticisms against Rawls and Nozick, alleging that they draw on
36
"bad sociology"3 5 or a "naive psychology."
Of course, deontologists have responses to such criticisms. A
well-developed account of human action, the deontologist might concede, must account for passions, desires, and other sources of human
motivation. The concept of obligation, she would continue, takes priority in the sense that it focuses human desires and other motivating
forces, so that they cease to work against moral ideals and instead supply actors with defensible rational motives for action.3 7 In addition,
the deontologist might continue, consequentialists take on and attack
straw men when they suggest that the practical theories of Kant and
other deontologists leave no room for virtue. 38
These objections have some force, and deontologists can avoid
many of these criticisms by specifying carefully how psychological and
social consequences inform deontological norms. Nevertheless, some
deontological theories suffer from these criticisms, especially Kantian
theories. For example, when Kant explains his account of morality,
he illustrates with the example of suicide. For Kant, the exemplary
moral actor is someone who has no reason to live "but is still in possession of his reason sufficiently to ask whether it would not be contrary
to his duty to himself to take his own life." 3 9 Yet hardly anyone ever
faces this choice. Kant's example is so removed from everyday experience that his morality seems irrelevant to the problems and capabilities of most individuals. By contrast, in the Politics, Aristotle observes
that "most men will endure much harsh treatment in their longing for
life, the assumption being that there is a kind ofjoy inherent in it and
a natural sweetness." 40 Although Aristotle does not deal here with the
issue of suicide, his comment does suggest a way to think about its
ethics-specifically, by inquiring first what ethical significance we
should take from life's inherent pleasantness. In this respect, Kant
confirms Maclntyre's criticisms, and Anscombe was on the right track
35

Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation,12 POL. THEORY 315, 324 (1984).

36

Ingrid Creppell, Locke on Toleration: The Transformationof Constraint,24 POL. THEORY

200, 201 (1996).
37 See BARBARA HERMAN, Making Room for Character,in MORAL LITERACY 1-28 (2007).
For other defenses of deontological ethics, see BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL
JUDGMENT (1993); ROBERT B. LOUDEN, KANT'S IMPURE ETHICS: FROM RATIONAL BEINGS TO
HUMAN BEINGS (2000); ROBERT B. LOUDEN, MORALITY AND MORAL THEORY. A REAPPRAISAL

AND REAFFIRMATION (1992); J.B. Schneewind, The Misfortunes of Virtue, 101 ETHICS 42
(1990).
38 See Buckle, supra note 14, at 566-67 (conceding that Kant treats the virtues);
Martha C. Nussbaum, Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?, 3J. ETHICS 163, 165, 170 (1999)
(same); id. at 170 (same for Rawls).
39
KANT, supra note 21, at 422, 38.
40
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 111.6, at 1278b28-30 [hereinafter POLITICS]; ARISTOTLE, THE
POLITICS 94 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984) [hereinafter POLITICS (Lord
trans.) ].
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to look to Aristotelian ethics for a more psychologically grounded
41
alternative.
In any case, this "bad psychology" criticism has seeped into contemporary legal scholarship. It is not hard to find legal scholars
ridiculing deontological rights or duty claims. Such claims (or so the
' 42
derision goes) imbibe a "heavy overdose of intuition[,] revelation,
or "necessary truths that the astute analyst can deduce from first prin'43
ciples applicable regardless of circumstance, time, and culture.
Separately, critics complain that deontological rights or duty
claims (especially Kantian claims) seem too categorical to implement
in practice. In some cases, Larry Alexander and Michael Moore explain, two or more deontological claims may come into conflict, in
which case "there is an aura of paradox" in any attempt to subordinate
one seemingly categorical claim to another. 44 In others, "there are
situations-unfortunately not all of them thought experimentswhere compliance with deontological norms will bring about disastrous consequences.

'45

These two criticisms create what I am calling here the "deontology trap." To apply the trap, conventional consequentialists make two
competing and difficult demands on deontologists. If deontological
rights may never justly be sacrificed, then they create absurd or extreme results in some cases. Once deontologists concede that deontological rights may be sacrificed, however, the trap springs:
Deontological norms are not really deontological at all. They are
rather broad presumptions, justified by "rule"-consequentialist reasoning but ultimately subject to exceptions when a consequentialist
calculus requires exceptions. At that point, deontologists have compromised on the only important question of principle, and everything
else is ajust matter of degree. In James Gordley's description, "either
rights must be sacrosanct or they must depend on utilitarian consider46
ations and so be defeasible when those considerations so dictate."
The basic thrust of this two-step trap is to say that any normative the41
See Trianosky, supra note 16, at 339 (complaining that "the Kantian tradition does
take morality to be autonomous in the extreme"); accord Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 173
("[I]f emotions are just subrational stirrings or pushes that have nothing to do with
thought or intentionality, there is not much that is interesting to be said about their relationship to ethics. They can be fed or starved, but they cannot be cultivated as parts of a
character that has a unitary focus.").
42
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY. RECONCIUNG INDIVIDUAL LERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 15 (1998).
43
Richard A. Epstein, IntellectualProperty: Old Boundariesand New Frontiers,76 IND. L.J.
803, 805-06 (2001).
44
Alexander & Moore, supra note 15, § 4.
45
Id.
46

JAMEs GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAw: PROPERTY, TORT, CO,-NTRACT, UNJUST

ENRICHMENT 11

(2006).
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ory that mixes rights and consequences "cannot form an intellectually
coherent whole," because it "must 'disaggregate [sic] into a mixture
47
of utilitarian and rights-based justifications.'
This trap has also seeped into legal scholarship. For example,
Kaplow and Shavell set the deontology trap in their title-FairnessVersus Welfare. They then spring the trap by positing a situation in which
a deontological norm has disastrous consequences-say, it "reduce [s]
the well-being of every individual."48 If the deontologist qualifies the
norm to conserve social welfare, she concedes that a consequentialist
theory of social welfare takes priority over deontology. 49 If, however,
the deontologist refuses to qualify a deontological norm to promote
the welfare of every individual, "fairness-based analysis stands in opposition to human welfare at the most basic level." 50 Q.E.D. Kaplow and
Shavell give attribution, appropriately enough, to "consequentialist
philosophers (often, it turns out, utilitarians) who criticize nonconsequentialists (deontologists) ."51
This criticism is also typical in property scholarship, where Alexander and Pefialver are confronting it. Consider the doctrine of adverse possession. When Margaret Jane Radin criticized deontological
tendencies in Richard Epstein's early work, she challenged Epstein to
52
Asreconcile adverse possession with deontological property rights.
sume that a title owner's possessory interest in the exclusive control
and enjoyment of her land is justified by a Kantian deontological
right.53 If the title owner neglects her land for long enough, however,
at some point the squatter's claim on the land and society's claim on
Id. at 11-12 (quoting SMITH, supra note 10, at 52 n.16).
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 52.
49
See id. at 62-81 (recasting fairness-based norms as utilitarian social norms).
50
Id. at 58. For a lengthier critique of Kaplow and Shavell's argument, suggesting
that the argument is analytically tautological, see Coleman, supra note 8, at 1525-30.
51
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 52 n.72 (citing J.J.C. Smart, Introduction, in
J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 5 (1973)).
52
See MARGARETJANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 108-09 (1993). Until roughly
1985, Epstein was more properly classified as a deontologist. Compare Larry Alexander &
Maimon Schwarzschild, The Uncertain Relationship Between Libertarianismand Utilitarianism,
19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 657 (2000) (critiquing Epstein's current metaethics), with Richard
A. Epstein, The Uneasy Marriageof Utilitarianand LibertarianThought, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REv.
783, 787-90 (2000) (clarifying his utilitarian theory and defending them from Alexander
and Schwarzschild's critique). Unless the text (as here) indicates otherwise, when I refer
to Epstein, I mean the utilitarian Epstein.
53
Adverse possession illustrates the deontology trap even if the deontological claim
right runs the other way. Assume the squatter's claim to ownership is grounded in a deontological labor-desert right to control and enjoy land he is actually using. That deontological right might then come under pressure from consequentialist considerations about the
utility of clear land titles. Among other things, clear titles reduce disputes over land and
land use, and they simplify commercial land transactions. As in the text, as soon as the
consequentialist considerations outweigh the deontological right, the philosophical justification of adverse possession seems weak or incoherent. See RADIN, supra note 52, at
107-09.
47
48
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the active cultivation of the land must take priority. Because adverse
possession is an institution that "the functioning legal system ... cannot do without," Radin concludes, "'absolute' entitlements" are absurd. 54 Once that concession is made, Radin suggests, it would be
hard to justify consequentially a broad conception of title ownership
and a narrow conception of adverse possession. After all, "it is hard to
construct a utilitarian argument concluding that an entitlement
gained through first possession is fixed for all time. Utilitarianism is
55
too empirical for such absolutes."
Of course, as metaethics or general categories of metaethics, consequentialism and deontology do not always or necessarily require different prescriptions to particular problems. "Rule" consequentialism
can justify rules that are to a great degree broad, formal, and unqualified. Deontologists may analyze rules inquiring whether they satisfy
deontological constraints from one case to the next. Even so, in both
practical philosophy and law, instrumentalists have strongly preferred
consequentialism (specifically welfare-maximizing act utilitarianism),
while formalists have preferred deontological theories. In addition, in
both practical philosophy and law, practical philosophy has suffered
because it has been tarnished with the criticisms of Kantian deontology just recounted.
D.

Virtue Ethics and Virtue-Friendly Practical Philosophy

If one takes a longer view, however, these perceptions of practical
philosophy are mistaken. As Julia Annas explains, "In the tradition of
Western philosophy since the fifth century B.C., the default form of
ethical theory has been some version of what is nowadays called virtue
ethics; real theoretical alternatives emerge only with Kant and with
consequentialism." 5 6 Although the following discussion will highlight
some of the differences internal to this tradition, Annas is surely right
to describe this tradition as a tradition. More important for us lawyers, the tradition to which Annas is referring 5 7 has heavily influenced
Anglo-American property law. 58 It is confusing and anachronistic to
project the consequentialism-versus-deontology dichotomy onto this
tradition.
54
55

Id. at 109.

Id.
Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 515
(David Copped., 2005).
57
Or, more specifically, the tradition of political philosophy corresponding to the
tradition of ethical philosophy to which Annas is referring. See infra part II.
58
See, e.g., GORDLEY, supra note 46, at 148-54 (recounting influence of Aquinas and
Scholastic conceptions of use on subsequent property law). See generally STEPHEN BUCKLE,
NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO HUME (1991) (tracing the development of property rights in early Enlightenment natural-law and -rights theories).
56
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I am going here to try to define "virtue ethics" and other virtue
theories more precisely than they are understood in conventional legal scholarly wisdom. 59 At the outset, let me acknowledge that that it
is rather hard to pin down what "virtue ethics" is. One way to situate
virtue ethics is as a collection of ethical theories that all happen to
stress moral character more than now-dominant understandings of
deontology or utilitarianism. Rosalind Hursthouse introduces virtue
ethics in this manner: "[I] n contrast to an approach which emphasizes
duties or rules (deontology) or one which emphasizes the consequences of actions," virtue ethics "emphasizes the virtues, or moral
character." 60 Virtue and character refer to "acquired, stable dispositions to engage in certain characteristic modes of behavior that are
conducive to human flourishing. '61 In core versions of virtue ethics,
the practice of the virtues is coterminous with human "flourishing,"
the term that Pefialver and Alexander 62 implicitly equate with the Aristotelian term of art eudaimoneia.63 Eudaimoneialiterally means "wellbeing," or "divine good fortune," but it may also be translated as "happiness," as long as "happiness" is understood as "'true' or 'real' happiness or 'the sort of happiness worth seeking or having," and not
"whatever happens to make an actor happy at a particular moment,
without regard for how other reasonable actors would rate that form
'64
of happiness.
This presentation of virtue ethics proceeds only at the level of
"loose slogans," 6 5 however, and it also excludes a wide range of "virtue
theories," which, though not "virtue ethics" theories in the strict sense,
still stress the virtues more than the conventional alternatives described in the last two sections. So let us broaden slightly, define different virtue theories more precisely, and situate them in relation to a
few prominent taxonomies of practical philosophy. Again, before
proceeding, let me confess freely and without reservation that my classification will not be satisfying to all virtue theorists. Such theorists do
not agree unanimously among themselves about which theories even
59 For other reference guides, see Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. Fall 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall
2007/entries/ethics-virtue/; Oakley, supra note 22, at 132-34; Lawrence B. Solum, Natural
Justice, 51 Am.J. Jumis. 65, 71 (2006).

supra note 19, at 1.

60

HURSTHOUSE,

61
62

Pefialver, supra note 5, at 864.
See Alexander, supra note 4, at 748.

63

See

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS,

supra note 14, 1.4, at 1095a16;

NICOMACHE-AN ETHICS

(Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 3.
64
Hursthouse, supra note 59, § 2. See also id. ("The trouble with 'happiness', on any
contemporary understanding of it uninfluenced by classically trained writers, is that it connotes something which is subjectively determined.").
65
HuRsTHOUsE, supra note 19, at 4. I am grateful to Nelson Lund for encouraging
me to make this clarification.
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count as "virtue theories" or "virtue ethics theories." Virtue ethics
could be understood as an "alternativd' to standard deontological and
consequentialist approaches, but it could also be understood more
modestly, as "a way of augmentingone of the two main ethical theories
of actions and rules." 66 Separately, while most virtue ethics theories
and their cousins are "neo-Aristotelian" to some degree, 67 particular
theories can vary widely in how "Aristotelian" or "neo" they are .68 Different scholars use many of the relevant taxonomy terms in different
senses. Most important, rather than classifying normative obligations
according to two or three external standards, many ethical philosophers instead prefer to treat different theories according to their own
particular internal metaethical terms.
With these disclaimers, let me make a few attempts to situate the
more prominent virtue theories. "Virtue ethics," as used here, refers
specifically to theories of human practical action that start with "virtue" in their foundations as consequentialist approaches start with the
Good, or deontological theories do with the Right. 69 Virtue ethics
theories in this strict sense have "aretaic" foundations, referring to
aret, the Greek term for "excellence" or "virtue. ' 70 "Virtue theory"
(again as used here) refers here to theories that seek to augment the
virtues within non-aretaic foundations. 71 Some consequentialist (in
the broad sense) theories take this approach, stressing that the virtues
are in practice necessary components for achieving pleasure or other
proxies for good consequences. 72 Traditional natural-law theories
also stress the virtues without making them central. The virtues are
not pursued strictly for their own sakes, but rather as part and parcel
73
of humans' fulfilling their natural purpose or purposes.
66 Buckle, supra note 14, at 565; see also Crisp & Slote, supra note 16, at 2-3 (arguing
that virtue ethicists "carve out [their] own niche [by making] essential reference to the
rationality of virtue itself"); Robert B. Louden, On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, in VIRTUE ETHics, supra note 14, at 201, 204, 216 (contrasting a "mononomic" understanding of virtue
ethics with one that "coordinate[s] irreducible or strong notions of virtue" along with
strong conceptions of act-focused ethical theories); Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 165, 168
(assuming that deontologists and consequentialists may both draw on virtue ethics).
67
See, e.g., PHILIPPA FOOT, Virtues and Vices, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1,1-2 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1978) (arguing that Aristotle
and St. Thomas Aquinas are foundational).
68

See PETER PHILLIPS SIMPSON, VICES, VIRTUES, AND CONSEQUENCES: ESSAYS IN MORAL

AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 93 (2001) (contrasting "neo-Aristotelians" who emphasize the
"Aristotelian" with those who emphasize the "neo").
69
See SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 304 (1996) [herein-

after OXFORD
70

DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY].

See Richard Parry, Ancient Ethical Theory, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

§ 1 (Fall 2004), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112004/entries/ethics-ancient/.
71
See Hursthouse, supra note 59.
72
See, e.g., Ben Bradley, Virtue Consequentialism, 17 UTnLITAS 282, 282-83 (2005).
73
See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 69, at 394.
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Scholars dispute whether Aristotle's own practical theory is
aretaic or some alternative. At one point, Aristotle defines the human
good (and eudaimoneia) primarily as "a being-at-work of the soul in
accordance with virtue" or "the best and most complete virtue. ' 74
This passage supports the view that Aristotle's practical theory is
aretaic. The human good consists not of pleasure, or of good things
happening to the actor, but exclusively of the actor's doing what an
excellent actor would do. Others, however, while recognizing that Aristotle treats virtue as constitutive of happiness, also read him to suggest that virtue is simultaneously productive of happiness. 75 Still
others read Aristotle to treat happiness as a cluster concept, covering
possession of the external goods and fortunes necessary to enjoy happiness, the virtues, and other factors.7 6 Yet no matter how Aristotle
relates happiness to the virtues, his practical theory focuses considerably on virtue and an objective and reflective understanding of individual happiness. These emphases cause his practical philosophy to
differ substantially from contemporary Kantian deontology or welfaremaximizing act utilitarianism.
I will refer to the diverse collection of theories that track Aristotle's as "virtue-friendly" theories. As used here, "virtue-friendly"
means that, in its application to practice, the theory in question makes
virtue operationally central even if it is not foundationally central. Of
course, there is no way to avoid confusion totally between aretaic theories and virtue theories with different core normative foundations.
Even so, in this context, the operational similarities matter more than
the foundational differences. I hope the term "virtue-friendly," construed ecumenically, accurately portrays the class of theories involved.
Let us consider next how virtue-friendly schools of practical philosophy relate to the divide between deontology and consequentialism
explained thus far. To begin with, virtue-friendly theories are not deontological in the Kantian sense.7 7 By definition, all virtue-friendly
theories (however loosely "virtue-friendly" is used) articulate the ob74

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 14, 1.7, at 1098a16-18; NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

(Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 12; accord Crisp & Slote, supra note 16, at 2 (describing
Aristode as having "perhaps one of the most radical virtue ethics ever, since he can be
understood to be saying that there is nothingworth having in life except the exercise of the
virtues").
75

SeeJONATHAN LEAR, ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND 154-55 (1988) ("The

aim of the Nicomachean Ethics is to give one a reflective understanding of how one can achieve
happiness by living an ethical life within society.") (citing NIcomAcHEAN ETHICS, supra note 14,
1.2, at 1094a18-25) (emphasis added)); accordJULIA DRIVER, UNEASY VIRTUE 70 (2001).
76
See, e.g., Fred D. Miller Jr., Property Rights in Aristotle, in ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS: CRITICAL ESSAYS 121, 125 (Richard Kraut & Steven Skultety eds., 2005) (quoting ARISTOTLE,
RHETORIC 1360b14-17); accord OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 69, at 127

(suggesting that it is possible to understand virtue ethics in such a manner that the "equation between acting virtuously and flourishing is broken").
77 See Oakley, supra note 22, at 138-39.
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jects of human action in terms of some combination of virtuous activity or happiness understood as reason and the moral sense regulating
the passions. 78 They do not draw normative prescriptions solely from
the idea of a norm or a rational will; the prescriptions are also
grounded in anthropological observations about what make individuals happy or outstanding. As Jonathan Lear explains of Aristotle's account of human action, virtues are really "organized desire[s]":
"[C] haracter does motivate us to act in certain ways, and, in Aristotle's
world, desire is the only motivating force for human action. '79
To illustrate, consider the following definition of virtue: as "an
acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such
goods." 80 To begin with, this definition presumes an egoist framework: Actors consider what is good in a broad sense in light of what is
good for them. Actors also judge those choices relative to external
goods-life itself, wealth, fame, or power-that "genuinely are
goods."' 8 1 Yet people can pursue and acquire these external goods
without becoming virtuous; in fact, the excessive pursuit of some of
them (say, wealth) can make people vicious (greedy). "Virtue" clarifies the goals of practical action by helping the actor appreciate
human goods to the extent that (and only to the extent that) "mature," "serious," or "reasonable" actors would desire them. Virtue,
however, also reveals a different class of goods, "internal" to human
action, which cannot be enjoyed except by development and practice.
So the external good of wealth turns out to be justified to a very great
extent by the extent to which the actor uses it to support internal
goods including industry, the character traits one acquires from practicing a calling, or the traits that come from practicing sociable virtues
that require a minimum of property. Of course, different virtuefriendly theories could pick at different points of this stock definition.
Perhaps the external goods ought to be irrelevant to the normative
account of human action. Different theories might make the virtue of
industry, the owner's state of pleasure, or different conceptions of the
owner's happiness metaethically paramount. In addition, scholars

78

See NICOMACH-AN ETHICS, supra note 14, 1.8-9, at 1099a13-17, 1099b25-28;

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 14, 15.
79
LEAR, supra note 75, at 164.
80

AASDAIR MAcITYnRE, AFTER VIRTUE 191 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasis removed); see also

id. at 184 (defining an "internal" means to a human end as one in which "the end cannot

be adequately characterized independently of a characterization of the means").
81

Id. at 196.
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may even reasonably debate whether some of the main virtue-friendly
82
theories are in fact deontological.
Nevertheless, the important point here is this: In contrast to Kantian deontological approaches, the stock definition just given requires
the ethical actor to justify some combination of external and internal
goods by their tendency to contribute to an objective and reflective
conception of happiness. As Stephen Buckle explains, such goods are
judged not in relation to "some sort of 'purely rational' being" but
rather in relation to a moral account of "self-love[, which] must be
accorded a central place in any workable ethical theory regarding
human beings." 83 If self-love and other desires establish the foundations, virtues organize them to fulfill the higher parts of human nature. As Justin Oakley explains, "character-traits such as benevolence,
honesty, and justice are virtues because they feature importantly
among an interlocking web of intrinsic goods-which includes courage, integrity, friendship, and knowledge-without which we cannot
have eudaimonia" and also because "these traits and activities ...

are

' 84
regarded as together partly constitutive of eudaimonia.
Virtue-friendly theories also differ from the most conventional
and consequentialist of consequentialist theories-welfare-maximizing act utilitarianism.8 5 Conventional act utilitarianism takes "utility"
or "preferences" more or less as they come, without second-guessing
them too deeply.8 6 By contrast, virtue-friendly theories are more critical of utility. Let me illustrate with Samuel Pufendorf, a natural-law
jurist who wrote in the early seventeenth century, a century or two
before virtue-friendly theories waned and ethical philosophy hardened around the consequentialism-versus-deontology dichotomy.
Pufendorf anticipated a common criticism of act utilitarianism-that
utilitarians impose "upon the less informed by employing the ambiguous word 'utility,' which has a double use, as it is considered from
different points of view." 87 Pufendorf recognized utility as a phenomenon relevant to practical action, but he distinguished between "apparent" utility and "rational" utility or utility "'judged useful by sound

reason."'

88

"Apparent" sources of human utility or pleasure are low-

82
See, e.g., Bernard H. Baumrin, Aristotle's Ethical Intuitionism,42 T1E NEW SCHOLASTICisM 1, 5, 12 (1967) (classifying Aristotle as a deontologist, while defining "deontologist" to
refer to any nonconsequentialist theory); Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 168-69 (suggesting
that virtue ethics consists of anti-utilitarians and anti-Kantians).

83

BUCKLE, supra note 58, at 70, 71.

84

Oakley, supra note 22, at 133.
See, e.g., Smart, supra note 51, at 9-12, 30-57 (describing act-utilitarian theory).
See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 22, §§ 1, 3 (discussing the hedonism inherent in

85
86

classic utilitarianism).
87
2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JuRE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LBi Ocro II.3.10, at 195
(C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688).
88 SeeBCCKLE, supra note 58, at 68 (citing 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, I.3.10, at 195).
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grade, meaningless, or destructive; rational utilities enlarge an actor's
happiness as understood by a reasonable, objective, and morally wellformed observer knowing that actor's life situation. 89 In addition, act
utilitarianism suggests that different forms of happiness, and different
actors' perceptions of utility, are more or less commensurable. 90 By
contrast (though of course within limits), natural-law and other virtue
theories are more likely to assume that different forms of human good
are "intrinsically variegated." 9 1
Conventional act utilitarianism also tends to be duty-centered.
To the extent that utilitarianism claims to prescribe a decision-making
process for ethical or political actors, it establishes a duty (maximize
utility) that does not treat the actor's interests differently from those
of anyone else affected by the actor's act. By contrast, virtue-friendly
approaches are "agent-centered" or "agent-relative." 9 2 They assume
that practical theories must give actors reasons for action that are especially relevant to their circumstances and (especially) the desires
that particularly motivate them to action. At least as important, virtuefriendly approaches stress that the actor's choices and conduct shape
the actor's future habits, capacity for action, and capacity for appreciating truth, justice, beauty, and other goods. 93 Because "[v] irtue
ethicists ...

believe reference to character is essential in a correct ac-

count of right and wrong action," they distinguish "virtue ethics from
act-consequentialist theories.. ., [which] allow us to say what acts are
right without referring to character at all."' 94 "[T] he good" is properly
understood "not [as] a passive external consequence of acting virtuously"; "rather, the good is active, and acting virtuously is a constituent
'95
part of what a good human life consists in."

Finally, conventional act utilitarianism focuses on consequences
in a more direct manner than virtue-friendly theories do. Act utilitarianism judges each act, on a case-by-case basis, asking whether the act
increases net utility. It is probably impossible to make any single generalization about how virtue-friendly theories apply as a group in rela89 See Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 168 (noting that many virtue theorists "question"
utilitiarianism's "narrowly technical conception of reason").
90 See id. at 182.
91

ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORAUy 13

(1993).
92
E.g., Crisp & Slote, supra note 16, at 3; Louden, supra note 66, at 205; see, e.g.,
Buckle, supra note 14, at 569 & n.12.
93
See Daniel Statman, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, in VIRTUE ETmICs: A CRITICAL
READER 3, 3-5 (Daniel Statman ed., 1997) (explaining why standard utilitarianism
presumes a moral duty to act independent of agent-relative considerations); see also Alexander & Moore, supra note 15, § 2.1 (defining "agent-centered" and "agent-relative").
94
Oakley, supra note 22, at 131.
95
Id. at 133.
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tion to consequences. Let us therefore illustrate with a few different
representative approaches.
Consequentialist analysis is downplayed in virtue ethics theories
(in the strict sense) because they are aretaic. Aretaic approaches
judge whether actions are right by whether the actor "honors" or "exemplifies" the right virtues in the course of acting. 96 In such theories,
consequence maximization simply does not describe what motivates
actors to act. Thus, in the case of friendship, "I am not required by
virtue ethics to maximise my friendships," nor "to have the best friendship(s) which it is possible for me to have," but rather "I ought to have
excellent friendships, relative to the norms which properly govern such
relationships. 97
Natural-law theories consider consequences, but they subordinate
consequences more than standard act utilitarianism does. Generalizations are especially dangerous here, because natural-law theories vary
widely depending on how they understand "nature" and "law," and on
how the reader understands deontology, consequentialism, and virtue
ethics. Let us consider Pufendorf again here, as a late but still-representative example of a prominent natural-law tradition. In
Pufendorf's theory, an actor should take account of foreseeable consequences in the exercise of prudence, which tries to determine how
best to do what natural law prescribes. 98 But the actor does not need
prudence until he first determines which courses of action accord
with the natural law. It turns out that acting in accord with one's nature promotes utility: "[N] ot only are [actions in accord with natural
law] reputable, that is, they tend to maintain and increase a man's
standing, reputation, and position, but they also are useful, that is,
they procure some advantage and reward for a man, and contribute to
his happiness."99 To say that "the law of nature is expedient," however, is not the same as saying that it is "founded in expediency. " 10 0
Pufendorf determines whether a certain source of utility is "rational"
by considering "the future consequences" of different courses of action, but those consequences are judged ultimately not by their tendency to promote pleasure or subjective value but "by sound
reason. " 101 Ultimately, utilities and consequences are judged as worthy depending on whether they accord with human nature, specifically actors' natures as selfish beings who must live in society with
others to survive and to be happy. 10 2 Here, too, Pufendorf illustrates
96

Id. at 144.

97
98
99

Id. at 143-44.
See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, 1.2.4, at 24.
See id. 11.3.10, at 196.
BUCKLE, supra note 58, at 67.
2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, 11.3.10, at 195.
See BUCKLE, supra note 58, at 62-74.

100
101
102
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how natural-law theories defy the anachronistic deontology/consequentialism dichotomy. Sociability simultaneously establishes both a
deontological imperative (because it instills in humans a need to obey
the rules of their society) and a consequentialist goal (because people
benefit greatly from social and political association).
Still other virtue-friendly theories consider consequences within a
consequentialist normative framework. In the opinion of virtuefriendly consequentialists, when virtue ethics (in the strict sense) focuses on virtue for virtue's sake, it makes the mistake "of missing the
point, of misdirecting our focus inward, onto our own motivation, instead of outward, onto the goods and ills of the world."1 0 3 A consequentialist may focus on the virtues for any of several different
reasons. The virtues may enlarge the sum of good consequences indirectly, by establishing coarse "rules" that, though not perfect proxies
for good consequences, are still better proxies than case-by-case deliberation consistent with act utilitarianism. 10 4 Or, a consequentialist
may construe "good consequences" more critically than welfare-maximizing act utilitarianism and settle on "eudaimonistic" consequentialism, "which claims that certain states make a person's life good
without necessarily being good for the person in any way. "105 This
approach "starts from a vision of the good and always commends acts
to the degree that they promote the good," but it differs from welfaremaximizing theories of consequentialism by defining the good in ac10 6
tive and agent-relative terms.
Of course, deontologists may fairly try to "expos[e] the slippery
slope into moral solipsism on which [consequentialists] must stand,"
and to argue that "rule" utilitarianism is really deontological moral
theory covered over with consequentialist window dressing.10 7 Similarly, deontologists, virtue ethicists, and natural-law theorists may each
wonder whether eudaimonistic consequentialism's account of "good
consequences" covers over moral analysis better explained and justified by each of their own preferred metaethics.10 8 It suffices to say
here that such accounts of consequentialism are not implausible, and
that they are substantially different from welfare-maximizing act
utilitarianism.

103
104
105
106

107
108

James Griffin, Virtue Ethics and Environs, 18 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 56, 63 (1998).
See id. at 60-61.
Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 22, § 3.
THONIAS HuRKA, PERFECTONISM 60 (1993); see id. at 55-60.

Larry Alexander, Pursuingthe Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHmics 315, 329 (1985).
Hurka acknowledges this argument in HuRKA, supra note 106, at 59.
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Virtuously Finessing the Deontology Trap

These and other virtue-friendly theories can respond to the criticisms conventional consequentialists make of conventional deontology. First, by starting with ordinary human passions, desires, and
psychological faculties, such theories satisfy MacIntyre, Anscombe,
and others' demand that practical philosophical theory stay close to
human psychology. Legal scholars sympathetic to Kantian deontology
might find these traditions useful, by the way, even if they prefer ultimately to hang on to deontological first principles. If a Kantian
agrees that deontology needs to be complemented with a well-developed psychology of human practical action, virtue-friendly theories
might provide that complement-even if they do not convince the
Kantian to abandon deontology entirely. 10 9
Let me illustrate by examining adverse possession in light of Samuel Pufendorf's theory of natural law. 110 In Pufendorf's account,
human life is typified by a natural neediness and necessity. Individual
humans need not only such basic external goods as food and the raw
materials for clothes and shelter but also a domain of discretion in
which they may be left alone to use those external assets productively
for their own self-preservation. 11' This domain of discretion does not
automatically entitle individuals to a moral right. Yet it does establish
an interest, or what Buckle calls a "moral power, since it produces a
moral effect, an effect on the legitimate actions of other human beings." 1 2 In a world without political divisions, this interest or power
would entitle each human being to be left alone while appropriating
assets from the common stock for her own personal and immediate
consumption. 113 However, humans also have powerful sociable tendencies, which they cannot fulfill without entering such intimate and
closed communities as families, extended families, associations, or
countries. The natural law requires that property be qualified and
given specificity within such communities; good fences, after all, make
109 See, e.g., HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 120 (acknowledging the possibility that one
can "add on an Aristotelian account of the emotions" to a Kantian account of deontic
obligations).
110 One could develop an aretaic justification of property rights, and some have done
so. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 76, at 124-26. Such justifications are so foreign to modem
conceptual categories, however, that it would be distracting to rely on them as part of what
is meant to be a meat-and-potatoes example relevant in contemporary law. I use Pufendorf
as a substitute because he writes early enough to be close to the medieval tradition, in
which virtue was a dominant category in political thought, but also late enough to speak in
modem accents regarding natural rights. See infra note 167 and sources cited therein.
III See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, IV.3.1, at 524.
112 BuCKLEF, supra note 58, at 92.
113
See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, IV.4.2, at 532; accord BUCKLE, supra note 58, at
96-97.
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good neighbors. 1 4 To enjoy society, however, associates must also
restructure their acquisitive activities. Unless they produce more in
less time, they will not leave time for social leisure. 1 15
Taken together, these two natural imperatives entitle members of
an organized society each to enjoy a domain of noninterference, proportionate to assets they are using productively for their own self-preservation, leaving unused assets alone for other members of the society
to use productively in the future. When associates create new stock by
their labor, the society acts in accord with its natural ends by rewarding their labor with exclusive property. When associates use existing stock, the society accomplishes its ends by protecting use rights
without conferring exclusive property rights. 1 6 Even so, each associate's domain of exclusive use is subject to correlative duties. Each
must harmonize her natural selfish interests with her natural sociable
interest in encouraging the survival and flourishing of her associates.
Of course, on its face, Pufendorf s account of law and politics
does not focus on the virtues anywhere near as much as a contemporary virtue ethics scholar. Because he is a natural lawyer, Pufendorf's
metaethics lead him to start his inquiry asking what aspects of human
behavior are "natural," and then what moral significance these natural
aspects have. Practically, however, the virtues follow cleanly from the
natural analysis. The social norms and laws that help man fulfill the
sociable sides of his nature channel his selfish tendencies in ways that
secure his self-preservation without letting self-preservation take precedence over sociability. In other words, these norms and laws aim to
instill in citizens a reflective understanding of happiness practically
quite similar to virtue ethics. For example, Pufendorf proscribes a
"useless and wanton destruction of animals"-not because it is bad for
the animals, but because it habituates people to an "insensate cruelty"
11 7
and "tends to the hurt of all human society."
A jurist following Pufendorf would need to consider many practical and prudential factors to apply his general account to the case of
adverse possession. It is not enough to appeal, as Kantian deontologists do, to such abstract universal assertions as: " [T] he right of property [is] the embodiment of the agent's freedom in the external
world.""u 8 The law could embody owner freedom more broadly, by
endowing owners with exclusive control and use over every part of
114
115

116

See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, IV.4.6, at 539-40.
See id.; accord BucKiu, supra note 58, at 100-01.
See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, IV.4.6, at 539-40; accord BUCKLE, supra note 58, at

102-03.
117 See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, IV.3.6, at 531; accord BUCKLE, supra note 58, at 92 &
n.148.
118 WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 176.
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their closes, or more narrowly, by protecting owners' exclusive control
and use over the parts of their closes that they are actually using. 119
By contrast, Pufendorf's natural-law theory settles the choice consequentially, by appeal to experience interpreted in light of prudence. 12 0 As a first cut, prudence suggests that the law endow land
owners with fairly exclusionary rights of control and use. In a welldeveloped commercial economy, land can be deployed to a wide
range of productive uses, a wide cross-section of the citizenry is skilled
enough to deploy the land to one or more of those uses, and owners
and developers have relatively free access to capital to convert land to
their preferred uses. Ordinarily, this process of rapid conversion is
enlarged better by establishing a broad exclusionary regime than by a
narrow usufructuary regime. The former has the drawback of letting
owners keep land they are not using. Yet the possibility of selling to
higher-value users ultimately enlarges the free use all owners get from
12 1
land.
On the other hand, the presumption in favor of exclusionary
boundary rules may be reversed, if a big enough gulf exists between
the title owner's formal and exclusionary land claims and the interests
of a person actively using the land. If a nonowner squats on the property and the title owner sleeps on her rights for a decade, the owner's
interest seems to lack weight, while the squatter's interest in the land
seems relatively valuable. At that point, legal exclusion becomes seriously removed from the selfish and industrious passions that justify
Pufendorf's interest in labor. Of course, this exception must be reconciled also with Pufendorf's account of human sociability. Trespass
law awards punitive remedies to owners who suffer deliberate trespasses. 122 This rule reinforces property-respecting social norms if the
119

In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., for example, a mobile-home company trespassed

across the vacant and unused field of a retired couple to deliver a mobile-home on time
when the public road was blocked by snow. Steenberg Homes was making productive use
of the field, the Jacques were not, and the crossing caused the Jacques no actual harm. Yet
the Jacques were entitled to a trespass cause of action and $100,000 in punitive damages.
563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). The holding reinforced an exclusionary regime, but the facts
seem to justify an exception respecting Steenberg Homes's harmless and productive use of
the Jacques' exclusionary right.
120 See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 87, 1.2.4, at 24. This is a fact thatJames Gordley overlooks. Gordley explains adverse possession on the ground that "when an owner does not
intend to put property to productive use, he does not have ownership in its true sense."
GORDLEY, supra note 46, at 144. To make this explanation satisfying, Gordley must explain
why trespass law at its core endows owners with ownership of land they have not yet used.
121
Cf Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin ofProlerty, 52 U. CH. L. REv. 73, 81-82
(1985) (justifying the same result in economic utilitarian terms).
122
See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951) (suggesting
that, when a court considers whether to refrain from entering an injunction ordering the
removal of a trespassory encroachment, it should enter the injunction if the trespasser
encroached in bad faith, irrespective of the balance of hardships); Jacque v. Steenberg
Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d at 157-58, 163-66 (upholding a $100,000 punitive damage award
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owner asserts her rights immediately after someone invades them. If
the owner waits a decade or more later, however, she undermines the
link between punishment and social norm. At that point, the law can
flip ownership from nonusers to users without undermining the
norms. Neither Pufendorfs natural-law theory nor any other virtuefriendly theory can say precisely when property law should flip from
trespass's presumptive exclusionary regime to adverse possession's
usufructuary exception. Yet such theories can justify the basic contours of both and focus attention on the questions that trigger the
flip.
Virtue-friendly theories may also reduce greatly the distance between instrumentalist and consequentialist argument on one hand
and formal, deontological, rights-based argument on the other.' 23 In
Richard Posner's analysis of adverse possession, the doctrine enlarges
joint utility. By not monitoring her land over many years, a title owner
signals that her utility in it is low; by occupying it and using it over the
same time, the squatter signals that his utility in it is high. 12 4 This
argument begs a few important questions. Posner's interpretations of
the parties' subjective valuations are conclusory. To be thorough, Posner would first need to show that the parties' utility functions are commensurable. Assuming they were, he would then need to cite
empirical evidence demonstrating, in rigorous social-science fashion,
that squatters really do generally have high subjective values, that title
owners do not, and that in adverse-possession cases there really is a
high risk that title owners will try to hold out to expropriate squatters'
subjective value. In addition, Posner's interpretation is economically
incomplete. It focuses on ex post concerns without considering seriously an ex ante concern that (as Posner explicitly recognizes elseagainst a bad-faith trespasser even though the trespass caused no physical damage to the
owner's property and allowed the trespasser to complete a contract that a severe blizzard
would otherwise have made impossible to perform).
123
In this regard virtue theories may help respond to a challenge issued by Jules Coleman: to understand both utilitarian welfare and deontic claims of justice and fairness in
light of more fundamental human interests:
Once we realize that welfare is connected to a person's interests-what is
good for him, and not merely to what he desires or to his gratification or
joy-it should be clear that whatever it is in that account that explains the
value of welfare explains as well the importance of the law's regulating
human affairs according to various principles of justice and fairness.
Coleman, supra note 8, at 1543.
124
See Rictaa A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALvSIS OF LAw 78-79 (7th ed. 2007). 1 use
Posner's justification of adverse possession as a point of contact not with economic analysis
generally but rather with act-utilitarian modes of justification. Economic analysis, conducted differently with proper regard for informational and act-specific limitations, avoids
many of these problems. I understand this to be an important point of Henry E. Smith's
contribution to this theme Issue, see Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation
Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).
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where 125) is usually associated with property: adverse possession may
sanction theft and destabilize social norms that minimize theft. To
avoid ad hoc economic analysis, one would need to determine in a
rigorous way whether the ex post consequence trumps the ex ante or
vice versa. To do that, one would need further empirical information.
I do not want to be understood as saying that Pufendorf's or
other virtue-friendly approaches answer these valuation or empirical
questions comprehensively. But virtue-friendly approaches have at
least two things working in their favor. First, on the valuation question, virtue-friendly analyses probably describe better how people do
assess adverse possession. People do not make judgments finding that
the squatter does have high utility in the land and the title owner does
not; rather, people intuit that both have behaved such that the former's interest objectively deserves to be treated as more weighty than
the latter's. If Posner's utility interest-balancing sounds plausible, it
may be because his portraits of the interests piggyback on implicitly
moral judgments. Second, virtue-friendly approaches are at least candid and realistic. They confess that they lack perfect empirical information. Pufendorf works with the little he knows he knows-that
individual human beings are selfish, their selfishness may be directed
toward productive or rapacious activities, and the productive activities
can be made to accord with humans' concurrent sociable tendencies.
Of course, this analysis is general and fairly intuitive. But it does explain the law more or less as it comes. It stays within the realm of
psychological generalizations upon which people feel reasonably comfortable relying when they make practical moral decisions. It is open
to revision on the basis of evidence more convincing and specific than
everyday generalizations. In the meantime, however, it does not restate commonplace intuitions in fancy social-science jargon and then
pretend that the jargon somehow makes the intuitions more scientific
or precise. For these and other reasons, I suspect, Pefialver's critique
of economic analysis has some force to it126-at

least, as long as the

critique is focused properly on economic analyses with act-utilitarian
foundations similar to Posner's.
As should be clear by now, virtue-friendly practical theories finesse the deontology trap. Land Virtues nicely states the contribution
in general principle. On one hand, deontological duty and rights
claims are often too "rigid" to square with many "consequentialist intuition [s] ."127 This contrast is contestable if one construes deontology
to refer to nonconsequentialist approaches as a group; it makes con125 See POSNER, supra note 124, at 31-32 (discussing the "dynamic" influences of property law on ownership and investment).
126 Pefialver, supra note 5, at 832-60.
127

Id. at 861.
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siderable sense if "deontology" is a shorthand for Kantian deontology.
On the other hand, to avoid copious information requirements and
controversial value judgments, it helps to put economic analyses in a
"broader moral framework, one that is sufficiently capacious to encompass the value of personhood, the demands of liberty, and the
128
important goal of enhanced social welfare."
Adverse possession illustrates one last time. The title owner's
right to be free from trespassory invasions of exclusive control seems
"deontological" at first blush, 12 9 but it is actually the product of psychological analysis of how people do behave and prescriptive analysis
of what will make them genuinely happy given what we know about
the selfish and sociable sides of most humans' natures. The prescriptions that follow from this analysis serve only as starting presumptions.
Adverse possession "consequentially" corrects the law's absolute tendencies in one repeat situation in which the assumptions behind trespass doctrine break down. But the consequentialist correction is
focused and limited by the imperative to make the law enlarge owners' and would-be owners' concurrent interests in productive use.
When scholars assert that a philosophical approach to adverse possession must enforce absolute rights or give way to instrumentalist analysis, they are attacking a straw man.
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that virtue-friendly approaches to practical philosophy are superior across the board; nor do
I understand Alexander or Pefialver to be making such a claim. Virtue-friendly theories are subject to important criticisms, which need to
be fleshed out fully. 130 My point here is simpler. Many legal scholars
who prefer conventional utilitarian approaches to consequentialism
often lampoon or dismiss philosophical theories of practical action
while relying on several criticisms most commonly associated with
Kantian deontology. By contrast, many scholars of different forms of
virtue-friendly philosophy have assumed that this criticism may safely
be explained away in a footnote. 13 1 Before blithely dismissing a long
Id. at 863 (emphasis removed).
129 Specifically, the title owner's right to be free from trespassory invasions seems the
product of a formal rule justified by universal prescriptions made by Kantian deontology.
Non-Kantian deontological approaches might take a more nuanced approach than the
"deontological" approach assumed in text. Among other things, deontological approaches
might establish a series of priorities for different relevant norms (for the use of land, for
the formal control of unused but still-owned land, and so forth), which might generate a
series of rules of decision.
130
For criticisms, see Louden, supra note 66; Christopher W. Gowans, Virtue and Nature, 25 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y 28, 29 (2008); Statman, supra note 93, § 5, at 18-22.
See, e.g., BUCKLE, supra note 58, at 70 n.61 (explaining why "[n]atural law theories
131
128

are . . . essentially non-Kantian," in large part because "psychological intelligibility is ...

non-accidental feature" of such theories).
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and important tradition of practical philosophy, legal scholars would
do well to consider those footnotes.
II
THE UNEASY RELATION BETWEEN ETICS AND POLITICS

Although I am enthusiastic about the family of practical theories
on which Alexander and Pefialver rely, I do have some reservations
about how they apply those theories. To repeat, in commonplace usage, "property" refers to a domain of freedom to decide how to apply
the object of ownership to one's own life plans, independent of direction from philosopher-kings or anyone else. Alexander describes this
view as "a right to exclude others[, with] no further obligation [owed]
to them. ' 13 2 Yet the commonplace view is a little simplistic, and because it is Alexander is swinging at a straw man. If one is going to
ground property in some sort of exclusiveness, it is better to call property a domain of freedom to determine use exclusively, shaped with
regard for the like domains of other owners and the interests of the
public properly understood. 133 Alexander and Pefialver trade on the
discrepancy between the crudeness of the commonplace understanding of property and the qualifications one must add to that understanding to make it precise. When they do so, they recast property too
far to the other end of the spectrum, where property consists of an
134
owner's right to do (only) that which discharges social obligations,
what contributes to human flourishing, 135 or the responsibility to do
what is virtuous. 13 6 In fairness, in both articles, property remains,
much of the time, a domain of discretion organized to encourage
owner self-preservation and -advancement. All the same, on the margins where it matters, both articles recommend that this domain of
discretion be limited, so public officials may decide how owners' use
rights will best promote specific claims about individual or civic
flourishing.
There are at least two problems with these approaches. One
problem, internal to property law, provides Henry Smith's point of
departure from The Social-ObligationNorm: more often than The Social132
133

Alexander, supra note 4, at 747.
See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATrLE U.L. REV.

617 (2009) (reviewing THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES (2007)) (critiquing the right to exclude conception in favor of a conception of an
exclusive right to determine the use of property); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in
Property Law, 58 U. TORON'TO L.J. 275 (2008) (proposing an exclusive right of agenda-setting); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 371
(2003) (proposing an exclusive right of use).
134 See Alexander, supra note 4, at 747.
135
See id. at 748.
136 See Pefialver, supra note 5, at 826.
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Obligation Norm and Land Virtues recognize, property law promotes
both individual goods and social welfare by avoiding pursuing first-order goals and instead by vesting owners with autonomy as a second13 7 I
order means by which owners may pursue those first-order goals.
might quibble with a few of Smith's examples, 138 and his response
confirms my concern that too many legal scholars conflate all moral
accounts of duties and rights with "deontological" accounts of the
same. 13 9 Those reservations aside, I concur with the main thrust of his
response.
This Response focuses on a separate problem: the relation between virtue-friendly theories and a political community's overarching
moral-constitutional order. In practice, when a theory of practical action makes "virtue" operationally central as a political category, it has
some built-in tendency to conceive of politics as a mountain and not
as a plain. People can coexist on plains, but there can be only one
king of the mountain. Politics often involves large struggles in which
some factions seek to acquire control or superior status over others.
In practice, theories centered around virtue reinforce such factions'
drives to be factious and acquire hegemonic power. Virtue theories
can therefore be extremely destructive and inhumane. This possibility does not make all virtue regulation inappropriate. But it does
make virtue theory problematic as a dominant category in politics. I
would be far more comfortable with The Social-Obligation Norm and
Land Virtues if they specified when virtue theories exacerbate or avoid
politics' factious tendencies.
The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues raise these problems by
assuming without serious qualification that they may mine virtue ethics for pay dirt in law. This assumption raises a complicated set of
issues. Virtue theories articulate fundamental values or ends for
human action. Almost all recent virtue scholarship has tried to illustrate its claims about fundamental values or ends by illustrating with
examples from ethics-the realm of practical philosophy focusing on
the choices individual actors make in their capacities as individuals
and not citizens. Most of the law, however, belongs to the field of
politics. Although there are exceptions (legal ethics), most of the primary law (especially property and tort) specifies and secures political
obligations. Principles that work well as hypothetical rules of practical
conduct for individuals may not work as well as compulsory rules of
practical conduct for citizens.
It is striking how gingerly leading virtue scholarship treads
around the topic of virtue politics. In On Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hur137
138
139

See Smith, supra note 124.
See infra Part V.C.
See Smith, supra note 124, at 967.
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sthouse focuses carefully on "normative ethics, not political philosophy," because 'justice is so contested ..

.

a topic that it would need"

independent treatment in political philosophy. 140 At least some virtue
ethicists go where Hursthouse fears to tread. In her writings (which
provide important inspiration for The Social-Obligation Norm' 41 ),
Martha Nussbaum generates political prescriptions from virtue principles. 142 Even so, Nussbaum has been fairly criticized for assuming too
blithely that what works in ethics works as easily in politics. 143 Fred
Miller, Jr., has explored whether Aristotle's virtue-centered theories of
ethics and politics might be compatible with a liberal politics of
rights, 144 but he claims only to have "ma[d]e a start" at answering
what he regards as a vast and problematic field. 145 In their 1997 essay
collection Virtue Ethics, editors Roger Crisp and Michael Slote foresaw
"in the not-too-distant future ... a companion volume called Oxford
Readings in Virtue Politics."' 4 6 To my knowledge, that companion

volume has not yet been published.
In his Reply, Alexander suggests that I am repeating some of the
extreme tendencies of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement
here when I say that most of the law belongs to politics. 14 7 I am not

channeling CLS here; I am channeling Aristotle. 14 8 Alexander,
Pefialver, and I all agree that "most contemporary virtue theorists
work within the Aristotelian (or . . . closely related . . .)traditions
... 149 I am sure we all agree that Aristotle is a helpful guide for

understanding the relations among ethics, politics, and law. Readers
should not misunderstand me to say that the following survey explains
these relations in any exhaustive sense; Hursthouse, Miller, and other
140
HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 5. Hursthouse thinks that the topic of justice, personal and political, is not only contested but also "corrupted." See id.; see also Rosalind
Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 4 (rev. ed. Fall 2007),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112007/entries/ethics-virtue ("Although Plato and
Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as [virtue ethics are] concerned, neither, on the
face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned.").
141
See Alexander, supra note 4, at 751 n.13.
142
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 7-8 (2000) (arguing for "a form of political liberalism in connection with the
capabilities idea").
143
SeeJohn Lewis, Giving Way: Martha Nussbaum and the Morality of Privation,8 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 215, 216, 217 (2001) (reviewing NUSSBAUM, supra note 142) (complaining that Nussbaum "seems to assume that every moral good should become a constitutional guarantee").
144 See Fred D. Miller, Jr., Virtue and Rights in Aristotle's Best Regime, in VALUES AND VIRTUES: ARISTOTELIANISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 67 (Timothy Chappell ed., 2006).

145

Id. at 67.

Crisp & Slote, supra note 16, at 25.
Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1063 (2009),
at 1068.
148
"The laws seem to be the works of the political art."
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, sup-a
note 14, X.9, at 1181a23; NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 200.
149
Pefialver, supra note 5, at n.168; accord Alexander, supra note 4, at 760-61.
146
147
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virtue ethicists are absolutely right to steer around these relations
carefully. That said, we lawyers are going to need to walk through the
door of virtue political theory now that Alexander and Pefialver have
opened it. Aristotle is as good a tour guide as we are going to get to
1 50
explain what lies on the other side.
If understood in light of virtue ethics, ethics and politics both aim
at promoting happiness: ethics the happiness of the individual actor,
politics the concurrent happinesses of all the members of the political
community. Ethics and politics thus overlap considerably. Aristotle
illustrates this overlap simply in how he structures the arguments of
the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics. After discussing individual ethics at length, the Nicomachean Ethics ends by suggesting that "perhaps
we might also have more insight into what sort of [political regime] is
best.. . and by using what laws and customs," 1 5 1 at which point the
inquiry cycles into politics. After the Politics conducts that discussion,
the last chapter considers how the lawgiver should structure
1 52
education.
Yet huge differences remain between ethics and politics. Ethics
focuses on the choices and actions of a single individual; politics adjusts and reconciles the interests of the many individuals living together in a common political community. By its very nature, ethics
self-selects a higher class of practitioners than politics does. Those
who study ethics voluntarily do so "not in order that [they] might
1 53
know what virtue is, but in order that [they] might become good."
By contrast, because everyone in the community must live under the
same laws and rulers, politics forces citizens who are naturally virtuous
to get along with citizens who have little or no natural inclination to
be virtuous. In Aristotle's diagnosis, there are far more of the latter
154
than the former.
That disparity creates obvious problems. One of the main functions of law as an institution is to make the many who are not naturally
virtuous more so-first by compelling them, then by shaming, habitu150
Although I cite Aristotle heavily in this Part and the next, I am not prepared to
suggest that I am interpreting Aristotle accurately on all the points covered in this Response. It suffices for my argument that Aristotle makes a number of observations and
normative prescriptions about the relations between law and politics and that these observations are so sensible that they should be considered in complete analyses of virtue
politics.
151
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 14, X.9, at 1181b20-22; NIcomAcHEaN ETHICS
(Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 200. Sachs uses "constitution" though I prefer "political
regime."
152
See POLITICS, supra note 40, VIII, at 1337a-42b; POLITICS (Lord trans.), supra note
40, at 229-41.
153
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 14, 11.2, at 1103b27-29; NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

(Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 23.
154
See NIcoMACHEANIETHICS, supra note 14, X.9, 1179b10;
(Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 196.
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ating, teaching, and then ultimately persuading them. 155 Yet the less
virtuous have an important say-so in the laws, and they usually do not
like being told that they are vicious and need to be made better.
Group opinion also shapes politics more directly than it does ethics.
When an individual studies ethics, he may conform his life to his highest good as he perceives that good. 15 6 Politics, by contrast, reconciles
the conflicting interests of different members of the political community toward the conception of the common good the citizenry settles
on. 15 7 That shared conception comes not from any single individual
but from group opinion, produced by culture, political arguments,
elections, or-worst case-victory after civil war. Civic virtue is therefore more politicized, and more likely to encourage civil strife, than
individual virtue.
Consider antiobscenity and antipornography laws. On one hand,
virtue-friendly theories can provide sound justifications for such laws.
If unchecked, sexual passions encourage people (especially men) to
view others (especially women) "as bodily objects of desire and potential sexual release and gratification, . . . rather than as full persons
with personal and individual sensitivities. ' 158 Pornography and public

obscenity are scandalous' 5 9 because they teach citizens that they may
pursue those passions wherever they lead. Common sexual mores
(and the personal moderation, civility, and relational goods they promote) depend on support from public laws, religious teaching, family
prescriptions, and general social norms. Public obscenity and pornography delegitimize all of these authorities. Some virtue-friendly theories would emphasize that obscenity and pornography are bad
because they encourage citizens to be lusty, others that the lusts lead
to the degradation or abuse of others, and different virtue-friendly
theorists may disagree reasonably about which kinds of sexual publications are innocuous or obscene or pornographic. Even so, at a high
level of generality, most virtue-friendly theories agree that some sexual
publications are problematic, and they converge in similar diagnoses
and cures for the problem.
On the other hand, there are also familiar arguments why it
might not be a good idea to have the law bar obscenity or pornography across the board. A well-ordered society depends to a large de155
See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 14, X.9, at 1179a33-80a14; NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Sachs trans.), supra note 14, at 196-97.
156 At least, as long as he does not violate any laws in the process.
157
See POLITICS, supra note 40, 1.1, at 1252al-6; POUTICS (Lord trans.), supra note 40,
at 35.
158
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 217 (1980); see GEORGE, supra note
91, at 95-96, 155-57; accord U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH §§ 2351-57, at 564-66 (1994) (specifying moral offenses against chastity).
159
See U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 158, § 2284, at 550.
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gree on its citizens' being able to turn away from obscene materials
without direct legal supervision. Overzealous regulation can interfere
with citizens' teaching themselves or their friends and family how to
turn away. Obscenity and pornography regulations are also hard to
draft in a clear and fair manner. 160 Different citizens may disagree
about where to draw the line between tolerable and indecent, and the
differences relate back to deep disagreements about religion and morality. If public officials enforce such regulations hamhandedly and
puritanically, the enforcement efforts can backfire. On the third
hand, however, these counterarguments can also be abused, by citizens who do not think that pornography is immoral but know they
cannot say so publicly without triggering a backlash in support of
morals laws. As a result, even in ideal circumstances, it is prudent for
a political community to refrain from regulating legally some publications that are probably ethically obscene or pornographic.
The law may neither prohibit everything that is unethical nor require everything that is ethical. If a virtue-friendly theorist wants to
broaden out from ethics to politics, she must therefore anticipate two
important complications. One is to assume mistakenly that ethics can
or should be apolitical. According to this view, when politics legislates
on virtue, it makes it impossible for actors to act virtuously. 161 This
claim assumes unrealistically that individual citizens can self-improve
in their ethical lives without serious prior formation from politics and
law. As Robert George explains, "[T]he law must first settle people
down if it is to help them to gain some appreciation of the good, some
grasp of the intrinsic value of morally upright choosing, some control
62
by their reason of their passions.'
The other danger is to assume unrealistically that the principles
that work in ethics fit seamlessly into law or other forms of politics.
This is the problem that so concerns me about The Social-Obligation
Norm and Land Virtues. Most of a community's laws are political in the
respect I mean here. The political community uses law as one of several tools to regulate conflicting interests-and as probably the most
important tool for teaching citizens what kinds of conduct they should
emulate and avoid. Citizens understand intuitively that laws make distributive comparisons indicating which virtues take the highest priority in the community. These comparisons provoke citizens to wage
160 "[T]he existence of something called 'obscenity' is still a long and painful step
from agreement on a workable definition of the term." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 79 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161
Katrina M. Wyman describes this view without embracing it herself in her Response
in this Issue, Katrina M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics? A Skeptical
Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991, 1002-04 (2009).
162 GEORGE, supra note 91, at 25-26. For an excellent analysis of Aristotle's analysis of
this issue, see Buckle, supra note 14.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:889

"culture war" fights. When politics encourages citizens to use law to
make citizens virtuous, it encourages factious citizens to use "virtue" as
a political and ideological bludgeon to help their own factions acquire
dominancy and to subordinate rival factions.
In his Reply, Professor Alexander suggests I am making a category mistake here. If law has room for judicial ethics, lawyer ethics,
the ethics of agents, and other similar fields, he suggests, there is no
reason why property law cannot import ethics as well. 163 As should be
clear by now, I neither mean nor need to claim that all law is political,
or that no sort of ethics can bleed into law. Moreover, these fields of
ethics are all exceptions confirming the underlying rule. In these
fields, the virtues instituted by law regulate an actor understood to
enjoy a context-specific responsibility to act as a steward of some sort.
The context and bilateral relationship make it easy for the political
community to agree on what an "excellent," "model," or "virtuous"
fiduciary or professional is supposed to do-or (more easily and more
often) refrainfrom doing. But such contexts and relationships are definitely not the norm in most of law-especially property. I doubt citizens who are otherwise strangers to one another will take it lying down
if the political authorities tell them they may use their property (only)
164
as "excellent," "model," or "virtuous" citizens would.
III
VIRTUE POLITICS?

The questions I am raising are questions of prudence. But prudential considerations range from the mundane to the world-historical. It is one thing for a virtue theory to vary how smut laws are
enforced between Las Vegas and Provo. It is quite another to reopen
the fight between medieval throne-and-altar virtue theory and Enlightenment liberalism.
Atmospherically, and in many of their examples, The Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues both intimate that property law would be
better off if virtue theory were moved out of the "periphery" to the
"core" of property. 165 As an abstract proposition, this suggestion
makes some sense. As the discussion in Part I suggested, virtuefriendly accounts of property do not necessarily make rights or duties
163
164

See Alexander, supra note 147, at 1068.
Cf MAcINnTRE, supra note 80, at 205 ("[A] virtue is not a disposition that makes for

success only in some one particular type of situation. What are spoken of as the virtues of a
good committee man or of a good administrator or of a gambler or a pool hustler are
professional skills professionally deployed in those situations where they can be effective,
not virtues.").
165
See Alexander, supra note 4, at 747 (citing Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. Rv. 1685, 1737 (1976)).
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or social obligations primary. 166 A normative interest lies at the core,
and the rights and correlative duties follow from the interest. So analytically, I can imagine a legal and social regime that puts virtue duties
at the core and rights out at the periphery.
Politically, however, deep historical, theological, and political
complications all counsel that property lie at the core of political discourse, and that rights lie at the core of property and the community's
constitutive political theory. By stressing rights, these prudential concerns suggest, the law should let slide legally and politically many uses
of property that might not pass muster ethically. Again, in discussing
these concerns, the discussion barely scratches the surface of an extremely wide and messy set of topics. Again, however, if The SocialObligation Norm and Land Virtues are going to reopen the door to virtue political theory, readers deserve at a minimum a refresher course
on why Enlightenment political theorists tried to barricade that door
1 67
shut for good.
Every so often, political and ethical scholarship experience a
communitarian revival criticizing property's selfish tendencies. 168 In
our liberal society, it is easy to understand why a communitarian alternative seems attractive. In important respects, contemporary law and
politics are atomizing. Enlightenment liberalism is deliberately
hardwired to have many of the characteristics of the city of pigs that so
offended Glaucon's senses of nobility and excellence. Virtue theory
provides a strong set of arguments, with a respectable pedigree in the
philosophy canon, to question liberalism's atomizing tendencies on
communitarian grounds. Furthermore, as it is usually presented, virtue theory seems innocuous. "Flourishing" is certainly hard to disagree with, 169 and "virtue" certainly seems appealing when used to
justify industry and other encompassing and uncontroversial
virtues. 170
Yet such communitarian complaints are historically contingent.
They suffer from the same "bad sociology" and "naive psychology"
166

See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.

This section and the next will explain the basic issues in the political-theory terms
in which virtue-friendly early Enlightenment political philosophers portrayed those terms.
To appreciate the issues fully, one would also need a sound appreciation of the history of
the same period, and specifically the full range of historical forces that caused medieval
law, which applied natural-law principles, to evolve into modem law, which drew on natu167

ral rights. For two excellent starts into that topic, see BRiN TIERNEY,

THE IDEA OF NATURAL

RIGHTS (1997); Benjamin Straumann, Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural
Rights in Hugo Grotius'sEarly Works on NaturalLaw, 27 LAw & HiST. REv. 55 (2009).
168
Indeed, Professor Alexander deserves pride of place in this project. See GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY

&

PROPRIETY. COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL

1776-1970 (1997);James W. Ely, Jr., Book Review, 43 AM. J. JuRs. 227 (1998)
(reviewing ALEXANDER, supra).
169
See Alexander, supra note 4, at 748.
170
See Pefialver, supra note 5, at 877-86.
THOUGHT,
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criticisms that have been directed at liberal political theories
grounded in Kantian deontology. 171 Such communitarian arguments,
the response runs, take for granted the tough-minded choices early
Enlightenment theorists made to confine virtue and elevate rights as
the dominant category of political discourse. "In its formative period," Enlightenment's sympathizers stress, "liberalism ...engaged in
17 2
a critique of classical virtue."'
Since we are all Aristotelians here, let me again use Aristotle's
main writings on ethics and politics as points of contact with the Enlightenment's departures. First, a virtue theorist living after 1600
might politely reject Aristotle's claim that the virtues establish a hierarchy clearly enough to order a community's politics. I am not saying
here that all prominent Enlightenment theorists were Aristotelians.
Yet otherwise faithful Aristotelians might reasonably have agreed with
David Hume's analysis of the relation between virtue, religion, and
politics:
[T]o assign the largest possessions to the most extensive virtue, and
give every one the power of doing good, proportioned to his inclination . . . [,] so great is the uncertainty of merit, both from its
natural obscurity, and from the self-conceit of each individual, that
no determinate rule of conduct would ever result from it; and the
total dissolution of society must be the immediate consequence.
Fanatics may suppose, that dominion is founded on grace, and that
saints alone inherit the earth; but the civil magistrate very justly puts

these sublime theorists on the same footing with common robbers,
and teaches them by the severest discipline, that a rule, which, in
speculation, may seem the most advantageous to society, may yet be
173
found, in practice, totally pernicious and destructive.
Notwithstanding their deep differences in other respects,
progressives and conservatives in contemporary politics agree on
Hume's diagnosis. Rawlsian Charles Larmore identifies "the deepest
departure from the Aristotelian perspective" in this claim: "On matters concerning the meaning of life, discussion among reasonable
people has seemed to liberals to tend naturally not toward consensus,
as Aristotle thought, but rather toward controversy." 174 Similarly, traditionalist Alasdair MacIntyre acknowledges that "the liberal individualist standpoint partly derives from the evident fact that the modern
171
172

See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
ChristopherJ. Berry, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Commerce, in NoMos XXXIV:

69, 69 (1992); see
(1989).

TUE

CHRISTOPHER

J.

VIR-

BERRY, THE IDEA OF A DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY

173
DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS Ill.ii, at 25-26
(Open Court Publishing Co. 1966) (1777).
174
Charles Larmore, The Limits of Aristotelian Ethics, in NoMos XXXIV: VIRTUE, supra

note 172, at 185, 192; see CHARLES E. LiuMoRE, PATrETRNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987).
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state is indeed totally unfitted to act as moral educator of any community."' 175 Robert George has sympathetically restated Aristotle's case
for public-morals legislation, and yet George still recognizes that Aristotle "plainly failed to allow room in his ethical and political theory for
the diversity of irreducible human goods which .. .are the bases for a

17 6
vast range of valuable, but mutually incompatible . . .ways of life."
Land Virtues relies substantially on Maclntyre and George's work, by
the way, to explain and justify virtue theory. 177 I am puzzled why the
article does not consider seriously what both authorities regard as a
serious limitation of virtue theory.
Enlightenment liberalism has a separate critique: Whether or not
the virtues could have ordered a consensual and harmonious politics
in Aristotle's day, the political program he prescribed for ancient
Greece would backfire now, in the historical, political, and theological
78
conditions of modernity. 1
When Aristotle writes about politics and legislation, he presumes
he is speaking of a community small enough that public officials know
citizens personally well enough to judge them on the basis of their
characters. He warns that an indefinitely large city does not count as a
city properly speaking. 1 79 He does not identify any single number of
citizens as ideal, but he suggests at one point that a city may be too
large if it is large enough to support an army of 5,000 citizens. 18 0 Aristotle treats religion extremely circumspectly. When he traces his genealogy of politics in Book I of the Politics, Aristotle explains why the
city emerges from the family-but he ignores religion and religious
law. 18 Separately, although my interpretation on this point may be
idiosyncratic, I read Aristotle to hint that the city must subordinate
the priesthood even as it maintains civic respect for religion.' 82 If re-

175

MACINTYRE, supra note 80, at 195.

176

GEORGE,

177

supra note 91, at 38.
See Pefialver, supra note 5, at 887 n.260 (citing

MACINTYRE,

supra note 80); id. at

873-74 & n.207 (citing GEORGE, supra note 91).
178
Within the context of a polis and an ethical theory intended to accompany
it, the strategy of pointing to a phronimos makes a certain sense. However,
to divorce this strategy from its social and economic roots and to then apply
it to a very different sort of community-one where people really do not
know each other all that well, and where there is wide disagreement on
values-does not [make sense].
Louden, supra note 66, at 213.
179 See POLITICS, supra note 40, VII.4, at 1326a25-27; POLITICS (Lord trans.), supra note
40, at 204.
180
See POLITICS, supra note 40, 1.2, at 1252a24-53a39; POLITICS (Lord trans.), supra
note 40, at 35-38.
181 See POLITICS, supra note 40, 1.2, at 1252a24-1253a39; POLITICS (Lord trans.), supra
note 40, at 35-38.
182 See POLITICS, supra note 40, VII.8, at 1328bl 1-13; POLITICS (Lord trans.), supra note
40, at 210 (proposing to make the priestly offices simultaneously fifth and first in priority in
the well-ordered city).
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ligious rituals are given too high a public priority, the religious impulse "assumes a position of imperious independence from which it
183
presumes to contend against the family" and even the city.
Oversimplified greatly, Aristotle presumes it is possible to establish a small political community; of citizens closely knit by nationality,
heritage, and religion; around a common political morality and a prolix code of laws emphasizing one or a few virtues as the keys to a right
way of life. In modem politics, nation-states have anywhere from hundreds of thousands to billions of citizens. The commonalities of race,
blood ties, and common language that Aristotle presumed no longer
exist. Neither do the local knowledge or the familiarity he also presumed government officials would have. Communitarian laws may
therefore ignite ethnic, religious, or class-driven civil wars. They may
tempt each race, sect, or class to acquire power, and then to legislate
its own factious advantage-perversely in the name of making the entire citizenry virtuous. Most important, religion is more capable of
destabilizing domestic politics now (meaning in the West over the last
half-millennium) than it was in Aristotle's time. Christianity is a universal revealed religion. 18 4 When politics is about legislating virtue
and not about securing rights, it tempts sectarian believers to gain
political power to compel subjects to be virtuous as defined by the
teachings of their particular sect. Since Enlightenment philosophy is
universalist, non-religious political ideologues can suffer from the
same temptations.
One might object that this portrait of politics is too dour. Yet as
Aristotle explained, when not properly shaped by background laws
and customs, man "is the most unholy and the most savage" of the
animals.18 5 There are many parts of the world where politics is this
dour. In those areas, when political rulers assume it is appropriate to
use force and law to favor one way of life as higher than others, the
results are depressing. For example, the country of Rwanda used to
include a majority of poorer, agrarian Hutus and a minority of richer,
better-educated, and more professionalized Tutsi. The two ethnic
groups were rivals. Between the 1970s and 1990s, a Hutu government,
led by head of state Juvenal Habyarimana, led a campaign of genocide
against the Tutsis. To legitimate the genocide, Habyarimana's ruling
party propagated a political ideology that "glorified the [Hutu] peas183
Thomas G. West, Introductionto FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES 9, 15 (Thomas G. West &
Grace Starry West trans., rev. ed. 1998) (commenting on Plato's dialogue Euthyphro).
184
See, e.g., Matthew 28:18-20. The same can be said of the other major monotheistic
revealed religions; itjust so happens that Christianity has been the most influential of these
religions in the Western world.
185
See Poirrcs, supra note 40, 1.2, at 1253a35-36; PoLTics (Lord trans.), supra note

40, at 38.
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antry" and subordinated the Tutsi as "petty bourgeois. 1 86 The ideology did so in part by declaring peasant life to be virtuous ("giv[ing] all
kinds of physical labor its value back") and professional life vicious
18 7
("fight[ing] [a] form of intellectual bourgeoisie").
One might reasonably wonder whether this example is fair. All
theories of politics have their success stories and their embarrassments, and perhaps I am focusing too much on virtue theories' embarrassments. On the other hand, in political theory it is often a very
good idea to focus on the worst-case scenario. Rights-based regimes
always come with a soft permissiveness. In bad cases, they devolve into
anarchy; in the worst cases, anarchy encourages tyrants or totalitarian
regimes to take over on the pretext of reestablishing order. Virtuebased regimes encourage the tyrants and the totalitarians straightaway. In not only their worst but also their bad cases, virtue-based
politics embolden a control group to wage civil war, to acquire comprehensive political control, on the pretext of wanting to compel everyone else to be virtuous.
IV
RIGHTS POLITICS!
In short, in the political, religious, and ethnographic conditions
that inform modernity, liberal politics is probably more humane and
prudent than pure virtue politics. Liberalism refers to a political regime that creates space for each citizen to think about or believe what
he finds most needful. To do so, liberalism organizes politics not
around the pursuit of virtue but the protection of rights. "Virtue" theory inherently points toward rivalrous and contestable visions of individual excellence; "rights" theory inherently focuses on commondenominator interests like life, prosperity, and family. Thus, in a liberal order, "property" becomes a dominant metaphor for the ends
upon which government should focus, and an implicit warning about
the ends that government should avoid.
This contrast explains why my argument reminds Alexander of
the CLS movement.18 8 One of the hallmarks of CLS theory is that it
rejects the public-private distinction. Aristotelian virtue politics differs
significantly from the CLS movement in many ways, but like CLS it
leaves extremely little space for the private sphere.1 89 Mixing rights
186 Philip Verwimp, Development Ideology, the Peasantry, and Genocide: Rwanda Represented
in Habyarimana'sSpeeches, 2 J. GENOCIDE REs. 325, 326 (2000).
187 Id. at 325 (quoting Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, Message of the Head of
State (May 1, 1974)).
188 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
189 See Harry V. Jaffa, Aristotle, in HISTORY OF POLTICAL PHILOsOPHY 64, 65-67 (Leo
Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 2d ed. 1972). But see Miller, supra note 144 (reading Aris-
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theory and Aristotelian virtue theory seems like mixing oil and water.
Without making very careful qualifications, one or the other ingredient is going to be distorted heavily in the mixture. Maybe neo-Aristotelian virtue theories blend more smoothly. But maybe the "neo"
elements in those theories make them too superficial to appreciate
the world-historical differences between antiquity and modernity.
Modern liberalism, let me hasten to add, is not totally incompatible with virtue ethics or other virtue theories. In theory, virtuefriendly political theories justify liberalism as a second-best regime. As
Larmore explains, "Aristotle cannot be our guide" to political practice
because "the cultivation of virtue... cannot be our common political
bond, though it keeps its importance in other areas of social life,"
specifically because "the meaning of life is a natural object of disagreement."190 Liberalism is defensible in a virtue framework as the most
humane and prudent means realistically available to secure the most
virtue and eudaimoneia possible. In practice, virtue regulation still remains important in a liberal political order. In such an order, however, politics tends to focus on the low and encompassing virtues, like
civility, patriotism, sexual modesty, and industry. Furthermore, the
liberal order advances virtue indirectly. At least in public rhetoric,
such an order does not promote virtue for virtue's own sake; it promotes virtue regulation as an indispensable means for helping citizens
enjoy their own and respect their neighbors' rights.
One concise way to illustrate the Enlightenment alternative is to
consider Locke's writings. 19 ' Locke serves as a lightning rod for the
communitarian criticisms discussed in Part III. His anticipatory responses to those criticisms are hard to appreciate because his diagnosis of the Enlightenment is more circumspect than Hume's could be a
century later. Yet Locke deliberately structures Lockean liberalism to
compartmentalize virtue as far away from politics as possible. To be
clear, in his metaethics, Locke is far from being a virtue theorist in the
strict sense of the phrase.192 Although it would take me too far afield
totle's political theory to be at least somewhat compatible with some theories of rights);
supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
190
Larmore, supra note 174, at 195.
191
1 have explained why the claims made about Locke in the following paragraphs
interpret Locke faithfully in Eric R. Claeys, The PrivateSociety and the Liberal Public Good in
John Locke's Thought, 25 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 201 (2008).
192
SeeJOHN LocKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 11.21.55, at 269 (Peter
H. Nidditch ed., 1979) (criticizing "the [p]hilosophers of old" for "in vain enquir[ing],
whether Summum bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be
found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided themselves into Sects upon it"); PETER
C. MVERS, OUR ONLY STAR AND COMPASS: LOCKE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RATIONAL "Y
123 (1998) ("[Locke] does not see in [natural human sociality] a natural inclination
toward lawfulness or virtue.").
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to defend the claim here, I follow others1 93 who regard Locke as a
eudaimonistic consequentialist. 194 True, in the Two Treatises, Locke
hardly ever mentions the term "virtue." 19 5 Yet, at least in his epistemological and ethical writings, Locke is interested in virtue. When he
explains the motivations for human actions, Locke sets "our greatest
good" as "the highest perfection of intellectual nature, [which] lies in
a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness.' 196 Locke
just prefers to assign the perfection of human character and the pursuit of happiness (to the extent they may be so confined) to the private realm. Locke's Some Thoughts ConcerningEducation impresses on
parents that they must educate their children to appreciate that "the
great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is this, that a
man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations,
and purely follow what reason directs as best though the appetite lean
'
the other way.'

97

To understand why Locke goes to such lengths to privatize virtue,
one must understand how Locke views Christianity. He regards Christianity as valuable because it inculcates virtue in people who lack the
means, the leisure, or the inclination for higher ethical education.
That is one of the main lessons of The Reasonableness of Christianity.198
See, e.g.,
JOHN COLMAN, JOHN LOCKE'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 195-96 (1983) (both
193
describing Locke's political philosophy as having hedonistic foundations); MYERs, supra
note 192, at 137-72; Nomi M. Stolzenberg & Gideon Yaffe, Waldron's Locke and Locke's Waldron: A Review ofJeremy Waldron'sGod, Locke, and Equality, 49 INQUIRY 186, 197-202 (2006)
(reviewing WALDRON, infra, and reading Locke to be a utilitarian); Thomas G. West, Nature
and Happiness in Locke (Unabridged) (2004), http://www.claremont.org/publications/
pubid.659/pubdetail.asp (book review) (arguing that Locke is a eudaimonistic consequentialist). ContraJEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALTY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS
OFJOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 82, 102, 225 (2002) (reading Locke to be a deontologist and a divine-command theorist); Peter Laslett, Introductionto LocKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 3, 81-82 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter
"Two TREATISES"] ("Locke's ethical statements .. .point in many directions at the same
time.").
194
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
195

See, e.g., Robert A. Goldwin, John Locke, in
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476,

476-510 (Leo Strauss &Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987). Locke considers the possibility
that "some one good and excellent Man, having got a Preheminency amongst the rest, had
this Deference paid to his Goodness and Vertue . . . that the chief Rule . . .by a tacit
Consent devolved" into absolute monarchy. Two TREATISES, supra note 193, 11.94, at 329.
In context, however, this example confirms Locke's overall reserve toward virtue understood as an open-ended goal of political life. Virtue is part of the monarchical political
system Locke seeks to displace. Similarly, Locke acknowledges that "Age or Virtue may give
men ajust Precedency" over their peers-but not to the point that the former may claim
the power to rule the latter without their consent. Id. 11.54, at 304.
LOCKE, supra note 192, 11.21.51, at 266.
196
JOHN LocKE, Some Thoughts ConcerningEducation, in SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING
197
EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING § 33, at 25 (Ruth W. Grant &
Nathan Tarcov eds., 1996) (1693).
241-45, at 169-85
See JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY
198
(George W. Ewing ed., 1965) (1695).
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But Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration focuses on Christianity's destructive tendencies in politics. Anticipating Hume, Locke warns, "No
Peace and Security, no not so much as Common Friendship, can ever
be established or preserved amongst Men, so long as this Opinion
prevails, That Dominion is founded in Grace, and that Religion is to be
propagated by force of Arms." 199
Locke therefore limits the extent to which politics may regulate
virtue. The Lockean commonwealth may regulate a few virtues-but
only low, encompassing, and uncontroversial ones, and even then
only indirectly. The greatest concession Locke makes to virtue is that
the commonwealth may regulate "rectitudo morum," or "rectitude of
morals." 20 0 When Locke's first English translator mistakenly translates
this term as "virtue,"20 1 he misses the point. Locke is going out of his
way to avoid giving virtue-crats respectable public reasons for stirring
up quarrels or contentions 20 2 about more elite and rivalrous perfectionist virtues. The commonwealth may regulate civic virtues only to
the extent that such virtues cover the moderation and self-restraint
necessary for citizens to govern themselves politically and privatelylike the anti-obscenity laws discussed in Part 11. 2 03 Even then, the
Lockean commonwealth does not claim that it is making citizens virtuous; it promotes virtue through the backdoor. Lockean liberalismjustifies virtue regulation as an indispensable element of "rights
infrastructure."' 20 4 In other words, the commonwealth inculcates selfrestraint, civility, and other character qualities not for their own sakes;
rather, without such qualities, citizens can neither enjoy their own
rights nor respect their neighbors'. This argument makes virtue regulation seem secondary. Locke makes primary rights-most of all property, which occupies the central chapter of the Two Treatises.20 5
Sir William Blackstone approaches rights, duties, and regulation
in the same spirit. Blackstone acknowledges that all individuals are
endowed with rights and duties. In his political theory, individuals are
entitled by natural law to enjoy rights "whether out of society or in
it."206 Duties, however, need to be broken down by whether "human
199

JOHN LocKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18 (London, Awnsham Churchill

1689).
200

JOHN LocKE, Epistola de Tolerantia: A Letter Concerning Toleration 122 (Raymond

Klibansky ed., J.W. Gough trans., 1968) (1689).
201
LocKE, supra note 199, at 40-41.
202 See LocKE, supra note 193, 11.34, at 291.
203
See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text; see also Claeys, supra note 191, at
223-24.
204
Michael P. Zuckert, On Constitutional Welfare Liberalism: An Old-LiberalPerspective, 24
Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 266, 270 (2007).
205
LocKE, supra note 193, 11.5, at 303-320.
206
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *123.
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municipal law should at all explain or enforce them." 2 07 For example,
"[p] ublic sobriety is a . .. duty [properly] enjoyed by our laws; private
sobriety is a... duty, which, whether it be performed or not, human
tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never enforce it by
20 8
any civil sanction."
Important sources in American law and politics follow Locke and
Blackstone's approach from the American Founding until well into
the nineteenth century. Of course, not all public actors in this era
subscribed to virtue-friendly theories of politics and law. In addition,
modem scholars must charitably discount for the fact that practical
legal reasoning in this time span skimmed over or finessed "dispute [s]
that savour[ed] too much of nice and scholastic refinement."' 20 9 Even
so, the political theory that operated as a common-denominator political morality in this period was influenced substantially by Pufendorf,
Locke, Hume, Blackstone, and other similarjurists and theorists. The
amalgamation that resulted is practically compatible with a wide range
of virtue-friendly theories notwithstanding their philosophical differences.2 10 (In the remainder of this Response, I will refer to this common-denominator political morality as "American natural-rights
theory.")
The Federalist's treatment of faction tracks much of what I have
said in this and the previous part, most of all in Numbers 10211 and
51.212 But The Federalist was not universally respected at the time of
ratification; it targeted swing voters in New York by arguing against
the anti-Federalists in that state. So let me focus on an organic document, Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights, authored principally by
George Mason, the namesake of my law school. Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights provides:
That all Men are by Nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent Rights, of which, when they enter into a State of
Society, they cannot, by any Compact, deprive or divest their Posterity; namely, the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the Means of

208

Id. at *124.
Id.

209

2 id. at *8.

210

See, e.g., MARK

207

WARREN BAiLE', GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL PHI-

LOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT,

1860-1910, at 24-84 (2004) (describing the standard

catechism of law, ethics, politics, and theology learned by college students in the second
quarter of the nineteenth century at leading liberal arts colleges).
211
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77, 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (suggesting that "the latent causes of faction are... sown in the nature of man" and
include "zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice," "an attachment to different leaders," and "the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of property").
212

THE FEDERALIST

No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 211, at 320, 324 (explaining

how the American political order secures civil rights with "the multiplicity of interests" and
religious rights with "the multiplicity of sects").
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acquiring and possessing Property, and Pursuing and obtaining
2 13
Happiness and Safety.
This article declares that the basic orientation of Virginia's government is to secure "inherent rights"-including "the means of acquiring and possessing [p]roperty." At a minimum, these rights are
consistent with virtue-friendly theories of politics, for all the rights declared aim ultimately at "pursuing and obtaining [h]appiness."
Now, some communitarians might fear, and some libertarians
hope, that "happiness" here refers to an extremely subjective and selfregarding conception of individual well-being. In context, however,
"happiness" means eudaimoneiaor some diluted but still-faithful modern rendition of it. Rather than take my word for it, consider article
15 of the Declaration: "That no free Government, or the Blessings of
Liberty, can be preserved to any People but by a firm Adherence to
Justice, Moderation, Temperance, Frugality, and Virtue, and by frequent Recurrence to fundamental Principles." 2 14 This declaration
(and others like it215) also confirm that Founding Era Americans promoted social virtues only in the indirect style suggested by Locke and
Blackstone. Governments may encourage and inculcate virtues, but
only the lowest-hanging fruits on the virtue tree. The Declaration covers moderation, temperance, frugality, but not religious orthodoxy,
speculative excellence, the excellences of farming, business, or the
martial life, or other rivalrous individual virtues.
This background explains, as standard property policy arguments
do not, why property serves as the "keystone right" in many contemporary liberal societies. 2 16 It is not that property rights are sacrosanct or
free from any limits; rather, property serves as an organizing metaphor for a liberal political order. In Federalist 10's phrase, in a liberal
order the "first object of government" is the "protection of the [diverse] faculties," "from which the rights of property originate." 21 7 The
pre-modern society Aristotle presumed had economic scarcity, which
created overwhelming political, economic, and familial competition.
By tapping into human creative capacities, property reduces the scar-

I (June 12, 1776).
Id. art. XV (June 12, 1776).
215
See, e.g., MAsS. CONsT. of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 3 (stating that "the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of civil government, essentially
depend upon piety, religion and morality"); Northwest Ordinance art. 3 (1787) (assuming
"[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge [to be] necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind").
216 See generally Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329
(1996).
217 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 211, at 78. But see The FEDERALIST No. 3 (John
Jay), supra note 211, at 44, 45 (describing public safety as the first object of government).
213

214

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art.
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city and softens the competition. 218 By transferring maximal control
over wealth-creating resources to individuals, the liberal commonwealth encourages citizens to practice and acquire virtues of industry,
self-mastery, and moderation. In most virtue-friendly accounts, these
are fairly low-hanging fruits on the virtue tree. Yet whatever their limits, industry and the other property-related virtues are necessary to any
more complete account of happiness, and they are indispensable preconditions to the exercise of the higher virtues. Equally important, by
focusing political 'Justice" on the protection of property, the liberal
polity focuses the public's attention on how well the government is
enlarging interests that all can agree benefits all. By the same token,
when "property" is the keystone right, the liberal commonwealth
steers out of the realm of public justice supposedly true, guaranteed
paths to universal peace and security in this life or to salvation in the
next.
Of course, this liberal outlook is not beyond criticism. Communitarians may say that virtue-friendly liberalism mixes apples and
oranges. It takes for granted that the citizenry is formed by and practices classical and medieval principles of virtue that the liberal polity
does not and cannot inculcate on its own. 219 Separately, CLS theorists
want to abolish the public-private distinction liberalism establishes, on
the ground that liberalism encourages too much private oppression.
Members of racial, national, religious, or ideological groups can harass, stigmatize, or subordinate non-members, the argument goes, as or
more effectively in private associations than they can when one such
group seizes the levers of government. 220 Pluralists may complain that
virtue-friendly theories of rights are still too demanding. Even though
virtue-based rights theories are less demanding than simple virtue political theory, they still allow a considerable amount of backdoor virtue
regulation, and they require citizens to subscribe to important common-denominator political opinions about rights. In that respect,
they are still significantly more conformist and communitarian than
pluralist accounts of liberalism. 22 ' Aristotle suggests a fourth line of
criticism: By encouraging technological development, the liberal polity quietly encourages materialism and destabilizes law, religion, and
22 2
other influences that form moral character.
218 See BUCKLE, supra note 58, at 124; Paul A. Rahe, The PoliticalNeeds of a Toolmaking
Animal: Madison, Hamilton, Locke, and the Question of Property, 22 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 1
(2005).
219

See, e.g., MACLNlYRE, supra note 80.

See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1996)
(examining racism and stigmatization in both governmental and nongovernmental
contexts).
221
See Claeys, supra note 191, at 224-30.
222
See POLITICS, supra note 40, 11.8, at 1268b22-1269a28; PoLiTics (Lord trans.), supra
note 40, at 72-73.
220
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Here, it is enough to say that, in the political, theological, and
historical conditions of the contemporary world, there are important
reasons why the political community might make property rights and
not virtue duties the core of the political order. One cannot have it
both ways.
V
RECONSIDERING THE SOCIAL-OBLIGATION NoRm AND

LAND VIRTUES

A.

Overview

Some readers might wonder whether I am leading up to suggesting that The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues are fundamentally misguided. I am not. At the level of theory, I applaud Alexander
and Pefialver for drawing on an underused body of practical philosophy to articulate fundamental values relevant to property law. In legal
and political practice, I also happily agree that property law can accommodate a considerable amount of virtue regulation without sliding down the slippery slope to ethnic expropriation and genocide as
in Rwanda. Although Blackstone thought it inappropriate for the law
to regulate private drunkenness, he defended on virtue grounds a
"gleaning" exception to the common law of England, which entitled
the poor to pick grain left over in fields after farmers had finished
their harvests. 223 Even now, obscene materials, and property used in
the course of obscene conduct, are usually subject to confiscation or
forfeiture on the ground that they constitute public morals nuisances. 224 Although the following suspicions would need to be confirmed, I also suspect that virtue ethics or close cousins to it can
explain and justify obligations in areas of property law that have the
relational character I described in Part I1225-the fiduciary duties of
will administrators or trust executors; a present estate holder's duty
not to waste land subject to future interests; or the reciprocal rights
and duties of co-tenants.
Yet both articles go further. Both make many atmospherical suggestions that contemporary property law "insulate[s] individuals from
the demands of society," 226 that flourishing or virtue duties should dis223
See 3 BLACKSrONE, supra note 12, at *212-13. Blackstone justified these laws on the
ground that they inculcated charity, specifically as understood in the Mosaical law. See id.
at *213; accord Leviticus 23:22; Ruth 2:2.
224 See, e.g.,
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (rejecting a due process challenge
by a wife to block a forfeiture proceeding against a car, co-owned with her husband and
used by the husband to solicit a prostitute, even though the wife did not authorize or even
know how her husband was using the car).
225
See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
226 Alexander, supra note 4, at 746.
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place rights at the core of property, 22 7 or that the legal-political order
can tolerate a mix of virtue and rights theory. 228 Here is where I draw
the line. The first suggestion does not accurately describe the core of
American property law as I understand it. The latter two suggestions,
if made without careful qualifications, threaten to disrupt the rightsbased justificatory structure of our liberal political order. Because this
disruption could have dramatic political implications, those latter two
suggestions deserve to be considered by standards as severe as the implications are grave.
Let me illustrate briefly with doctrinal points of contact upon
which The Social-ObligationNorm and Land Virtues specifically focus. I
apply to both articles the criteria that Alexander follows explicitly and
Pefialver follows implicitly. Both articles are positive to the extent
they "provide an explanatory account of doctrinal practices in which
private owners are required to sacrifice their ownership interests in
some way." 229 Both are normative to the extent that the virtue theories they propose rationalize "when and why [those virtue theories]
justif[y] the community requiring such sacrifices of private owners." 23 0
B.

Nuisance Remedies

Scratch the surface of American property rights, and more virtuefriendly theory lurks underneath than its rights-based structure first
suggests. That is my main reaction to The Social-ObligationNorm's positive claims. Let me illustrate using that article's discussion of nuisance
remedy doctrine as a point of contact. 23 1 Generally, equity presumes
that a complainant is not entitled to equitable relief unless his remedy
at law is inadequate. 23 2 Nuisance law flips this principle to presume
that a land owner is entitled to abatement if she is suffering a substantial and ongoing nuisance. 233 Nuisance law flips this presumption
once again, however, if the defendant can show that it and the local
community will suffer hardship far greater from an order abating the

229

See id. at 747.
See Alexander, supra note 147, at 754-55.
Alexander, supra note 4, at 774.

230

Id.

227
228

231
232
233

Id. at 779-82.
See, e.g., Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. App. 1973).
See id. at 221-22 (suggesting that the court would deny the injunction only if the
polluter could satisfy a " ' stem rule of necessity rather than on the right of the [polluter] to
work a hurt, or injury to his neighbor'" (quoting Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co.,
226 S.W.2d 615, 619 (Tex. 1950))); Quinn v. Am. Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co., 141 A- 855,
857, 858 (Pa. 1928) (holding that the defendant must move equipment in its iron and steel
plant in order to minimize damage to a neighbor's house and providing for an injunction
if the defendant could not comply).
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defendant's pollution than the plaintiff will suffer from being limited
2 34
to damages only.

This series of rules and exceptions confirms the contributions
that The Social-Obligation Norm makes, as fleshed out in Part I: The Social-ObligationNorm sketches a relation between rights and responsibilities that is much richer and closer to the moral phraseology in
doctrine than current scholarship. Nuisance remedies are simple but
foundational elements of property doctrine. They are also extremely
contested symbolic territory in legal scholarship because of their close
association with Calabresi and Melamed's economic taxonomy of
property rules and liability rules. 235 If scholars assume that the deon-

tology trap makes a clinching philosophical argument, nuisance's pattern of rules and exceptions seems nonsensical.
If, however, property rights are understood as claim rights that
are justified and limited by virtue-friendly theory, the philosophical
account of rights and remedies is far harder to dismiss. One need not
rely specifically on American natural-rights theory or Nussbaum and
Sen's theory of human flourishing; 23 6 most virtue-friendly theories
(and many other non-virtue-friendly theories) would converge on the
following general justification. 23 7 Owners' interest in labor for their
own personal ends vests owners not only with the control over their
lots they get from trespass law238 but also with a domain of practical
discretion to choose how to deploy their land toward many possible
uses, for many possible individualized ends. This domain explains
why nuisance law flips the presumption against equity, and "deontologically" makes polluters abate pollution threatening neighbors' interests in the free and active use of their own property. Because all
owners' property rights are all grounded ultimately in similar interests, however, the pollutees' rights must be qualified "consequentially," in cases in which an injunction threatens to restrain the like
rights and underlying interests of the polluter and people who have
close relations with the polluter. Because property rights are oriented
toward enlarging sociable owners' free use of their properties, nui234
See, e.g., Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873, n.* (N.Y. 1970) (noting
the number of employees and the amount invested in a cement plant before declining to
permanently enjoin the plant as a nuisance); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper &
Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 661, 666-67 (Tenn. 1904) (declining to permanently enjoin mining
and manufacturing operations, but granting damages after comparing the value of the
industry to the surrounding property).
235 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral; 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
236 See Alexander, supra note 4, at 762-64.
237
See, e.g.,J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 49 (1997) ("If we believe in any
fairly robust interest in autonomy, then the interest in determining the use of things is in
part an interest in trying to achieve different goals.").
238 See supra Part I.E.
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sance doctrine may rearrange or qualify legal rights by taking account
of the consequences different rearrangements have for the moral interests underlying the rights. At the same time, the moral interest focuses the consequentialist reallocation.
That said, I am concerned that The Social-Obligation Norm may
overstate its positive claim in relation to nuisance remedies. I am a
little unclear what precisely The Social-ObligationNorm claims to explain
about remedial doctrine in nuisance. The article could be read to
claim that it provides the first significant explanation why the nuisance cases that rely on justice theory and not economic analysis qualify the entitlement to an injunction at all. If that is the claim, I am not
persuaded. In American property law, many equity decisions relied
on common-denominator American natural-rights theory to explain
when a nuisance plaintiff was no longer entitled to an injunction.
Even Blackstone, author of the "sole and despotic dominion" definition of property, 23 9 qualified that definition for external assets that
"must still unavoidably remain in common"-including "air, and
water," used by "mills, and other conveniences."' 2 40 Nuisance remedy
doctrine applies that proviso in straightforward fashion to pollution
cases. In cases "of conflicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his
own without in some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the
use of property," it has long been settled that nuisance "law must
make the best arrangement it can between the contending parties,
with a view to preserving to each one the largest measure of liberty
' 24 1
possible under the circumstances."
Perhaps The Social-Obligation Norm is making a more precise explanatory claim: When courts decide to limit a prevailing plaintiff to
damages ("Rule 2" or plaintiff-prevailing "liability rule" cases 2 4 2 ), they
do so relying on the Nussbaum-Sen capabilities approach. In other
words, when a court limits a plaintiff-owner to damages, it usually relies on the fact that the productive activity producing the noxious pollution provides "an essential part of the infrastructure undergirding
th[e] culture" necessary to the pollutee and the polluter's commu239

2

BLACKSTONE,

supra note 12, at *2.

Id. at *14.
241
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 667 (Tenn. 1904);
seeJAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICA N LAw 200-05 (2001); Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 621, 647-48, 656-63 (1976).
Some of the confusion here stems also from a tendency in the cases to describe property in terms of the lay conception of the "right to exclude." As Alexander correctly notes,
.exclude" focuses on the right without the correlative duty. If property refers to a domain
of "[e]xclusivity," "exclusive use" accentuates the fact that boundaries steer parallel discretion to many different owners simultaneously. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
242
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 235, at 1116.
240
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nity. 2 4 3 I

read the equity cases differently. I prefer to categorize the
Rule 2 cases into two periods. One consists of cases starting with and
following on Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 244 I would not use theories
of justice to explain these cases. On their faces, Boomer and cases following it rely instead on instrumentalist utilitarian interest-balancing
245
consistent with sections 826-28 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The other period covers nuisance cases up through the 1960s.
These cases do speak in the phraseology ofjustice and rights. Descriptively, however, I do not read them to apply a capabilities approach.
The pre-1970 cases do not consider seriously whether the plaintiffs
rights claims should be qualified because the defendant's land use
supplies infrastructure contributing importantly to the plaintiffs
flourishing. The cases I regard as the leading cases focus on two factors. First, they inquire whether the noxious pollution is the product
of "a lawful enterprise engaged in the utilization of a natural product
of the community in the manufacture of a useful and necessary commodity," and, if so, then on whether the economic hardship to the
2 46
defendants and others greatly outweighs the plaintiffs' hardships.
In this phrasing, it does not matter whether there is a "nexus between the [defendant] whose activity is under challenge and the
goods necessary to a well-lived life .... 247 All that matters is that the
defendant's product be legitimate-"lawful," "useful," or "necessary."
243
244

Alexander, supra note 4, at 780.
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). In fairness, even after Boomer, many modern cases

continue to weigh the equities more skeptically than Boomer encourages. See, e.g., Estancias
Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App. 1973). Even in Boomer, on remand, the
trial court awarded the plaintiffs quadruple the actual damages it had determined they had
suffered before appeal. See Daniel A. Farber, ReassessingBoomer:Justice,Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, inPROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS INHONOR OFJOHN E. CRIBBET 7,
8-11 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Heoflich eds., 1988). For a skeptical account of Boomer,
consider Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 923 (1999).
245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-28 (1979). I might use a theory ofjustice
to interpret an instrumentalist opinion if the opinion's instrumentalist arguments are so
question-begging they seem likely to be recasting instrumentally latent and unarticulated
claims of justice. Posner's economic analysis of adverse possession reads this way to me.
See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. That possibility might apply to economic
analysis of nuisance remedies, but whether it does or not is a question too complicated and
tangential to explore here.
246 King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636, 638 (5th Cir. 1945); see Pendoley v.
Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Mass. 1963) (giving "[d]ue consideration ... to the [defendants'] economic interest in an orderly, rather than a hurried, liquidation of their [polluting business]"); Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 at *4 (1871) (denying injunctive
relief where "the business of the defendants is .. . lawful in itself and necessary to the
community"); Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co, 226 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1950)
(focusing on whether the defendant engaged in a "lawful" activity); see also H.G. WOOD, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARUous FORMS: INCLUDING REME-

DIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 1182 (3d ed. 1893) ("[T]he effect upon the defendant's business and interests will be considered.").
247 Alexander, supra note 4, at 781.
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This approach avoids (at least, as much as the law can) playing favorites among different legitimate uses. If the defendant's use hits the
plaintiff where the plaintiff lives, at first blush it ought to be abatednot because it is per se valueless, but because the defendant's use steals
more than its fair share of active use-discretion. If the hardship to the
defendant and other parties dependent on it greatly outweighs the
hardship to the plaintiff, however, the plaintiffs interest in use choice
must give way to the similar but greater interests of the defendant and
248
its associates.
Alexander may instead be making a normative argument, that the
Sen-Nussbaum capabilities approach adds a consideration that is not
now but should be added to in current nuisance doctrine. Here, however, I have serious questions. Residential plaintiffs and defendant
factory owners both contribute by their uses to different capabilities
and modes of flourishing in a well-ordered society. Because the capabilities approach cuts both ways, the court must cut through the parties' competing arguments by prioritizing the parties' land uses
according to local conceptions of flourishing. Some cases take an approach similar to this, but they have not gained traction, in large part
because they are obviously political. 249 For reasons Henry Smith
sketches in his response, I find the approach taken in pre-Boomer nui2 50
sance cases more palatable because it is less political.
C.

Trespass Liability

One may fairly wonder whether I am too pessimistic, or even
paranoid, about the possibility that political forces will overwhelm the
capability of judges, regulators, and other relevant public officials.
Maybe we ought to trust such officials to use prudence to resolve the
conflicts I am raising. Yet just because someone is paranoid does not
mean there is not reason to be worried.
Let me illustrate with State v. Shack,251 which gets substantial treatment in both lead articles. Before proceeding, I freely confess that,
while I am critical of Shack, I do not think its holding is disastrous.
American law muddles along tolerating other unjustifiable exceptions
on trespassory rights, 252 and it has also survived Shack without sliding
248 Provided the law recognizes that the plaintiff has suffered some invasion of rights
and holds the plaintiff harmless for the taking with proper damages.
249
Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 701 P.2d 222, 227 (Idaho 1985), takes this approach, but the case is regarded as an outlier. See, e.g., RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 361
(2001) (praising the "strong dissent" for "rightly denounc[ing]" the majority's approach).
250
See Smith, supra note 124, at 985-86.
251
277 A.2d 369 (NJ. 1971).
252 See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 77, 88 (1980) (holding
that a state law did not violate property rights when it prevented a private shopping center
from excluding individuals seeking signatures for a petition).
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down the slippery slope to Rwanda. Even so, one lesson from virtue
ethics is that people become vicious not in big steps but by habituating themselves not to act virtuously in a series of small steps. Shack is
the legal equivalent of one of these missteps. Alexander and Pefialver
both treat Shack as a model case illustrating their virtue approaches.
In doing so, both confirm an important problem with virtue theory: It
is too easy and tempting for all of us to assume that our causes are
virtuous, and that our opponents' are not.
In Shack, a federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC) attorney and
a federal Southwest Citizens Organization for Poverty Elimination
(SCOPE) field worker went onto a farm to meet migrant laborers who
were working that farm and being housed at a campsite on it.253 The
farm owner denied their request to meet the laborers in their camp
and offered to produce the laborers to them instead. When the attorney and field worker declined this offer and refused to leave, the farm
owner instituted a criminal trespass action. 254 To reverse the attorney
and fielder worker's convictions, the NewJersey Supreme Court qualified the possessory interest in exclusive control at the core of trespass,
so that the owner's right to exclude turns on whether the utilities in
favor of exclusion outweigh the utilities in favor of no exclusion. In
Shack, the migrant laborers' dependent condition and possible exploitation tipped the balance. 255 Pefialver cites this case as a good
example of virtue ethics in action; it illustrates the social responsibility
of farmer-owners to respect the obligations of justice understood as
respect for the minimal conditions the migrant workers need to flourish. 256 Alexander cites it to illustrate how affiliation contributes to
25 7

human flourishing.
That is the standard version of Shack on the facts and in the law
reviews; now let me complicate the story. To begin with, the legal
issue in Shack was quite narrow. Again, the farm owner offered to notify his migrant-boarders that they had visitors. (I think it would be
appropriate to make this duty an obligation on the farm owner.) So
the question was not whether the migrants were going to be denied
meaningful access to the outside world; the issue was instead whether
their dignity interests required not just notice but also the same rights
as tenants to invite guests onto the farmer's land.
Separately, in my legal opinion, and contrary to Alexander and
Pefialver's, Shack departs substantially from foundational principles of
trespass. As a first approximation, trespass law presumes that "[a]ny
253
254
255
256

257

See Shack, 277 A.2d at 370,
See id. at 370-71.
See id. at 373-75.
Pefialver, supra note 5, at 883-84.
See Alexander, supra note 4, at 808.
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physical entry upon the surface of the land is a trespass," 258 or (in
Blackstone's words) that "every entry [on the owner's soil] without the
owner's leave, and especially if contrary to his express order, is a trespass or transgression." 259 There have always been exceptions to this
rule (private necessity260 ), of course, and the law continues to develop
new ones (airplane overflights 2 61). I doubt Shack can be justified as
such an exception. That Shack has not often been followed suggests to
me that other courts doubt its holding "fits" basic trespass
2 62
principles.
Next, there are good reasons for suspecting that there was more
blame to go around in Shack than comes across in the case's statement
of facts. Because the convictions were not defended on appeal, 263 the
careful reader must discount for the possibility that the record on appeal was one-sided. The case was also prosecuted as a criminal-trespass
action against the LSC and SCOPE workers. Although governmentfunded advocates are not the same as police or other government executive officers, a court might reasonably conclude that any criminaltrespass holding against the former might set a precedent against the
latter. Moreover, the LSC and SCOPE workers were trespassing on
the farm owner's property to protect the interests of migrant farm
workers, a generally unrepresented class. At the same time, the New
Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged euphemistically in Shack that
"[d] ifferences had developed between" the farm owner and the legal26 4
service attorney and the field worker in previous confrontations.
Inquiring minds would want to know more about those differences.
Most important, farm owners and migrant advocates have fought
one another bitterly in farm communities since the LSC was established, and each group has its own virtues and vices. 265 Politically, the
immediate issue in these disputes is whether migrant farm workers
may organize and join agricultural-worker unions. Governmentfunded migrant advocates and union organizers want the migrants to
organize; farm owners do not. This political conflict is understood by
the contestants to be a stand-in for a more fundamental virtue con258
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flict: whether farmers or agricultural-union leaders and governmentfunded lawyers and case workers deserve to be the "leading citizens"
in agricultural communities. Advocates and union organizers think
that many farm owners are racist or domineering, and that owners
subordinate their migrant laborers to keep them ignorant of their
wage and union rights. 266 For their part, farmers would not last long
26 7
at farming if they did not genuinely like farming and enjoy land.

Suburban and urban residents thus may not appreciate sufficiently
why a boundary invasion might be more offensive to a rural owner,
who values land for its own sake.2 68 As for the advocates and union
organizers, farmers think many of them are carpetbaggers, socialists,
2 69
or activists too eager to take the law into their own hands.
With that context, Shack does not seem sympathetic enough to
appreciate the farm owner's injury claim. When the law presumes
that every entry is a primafacie trespass, it protects an owner's interest
in not having her land commandeered by a stranger to broadcast a
message to which she objects. First Amendment "compelled speech"
doctrine focuses on this problem more than property or tort scholarship do, 2 70 but trespass institutionalizes the same principle by presuming harm from any entry. Maybe the euphemistic earlier "disputes"
occurred because on previous occasions the LSC attorney and SCOPE
field worker had fomented dissension between the farm owner and
his farmhands. Later after Shack, in the 1970s and 1980s, LSC personnel ran institutes training field workers to conduct surveillance explicitly modeled after paramilitary techniques. These materials
encouraged researchers to conduct "muckracking," specifically with a
view toward "neutraliz[ing] opposition." 2 7 1 Landowners might not
have been able to stop trainee-lawyers from meeting with potential
clients, but one can understand why they might not have wanted to
contribute their own property to such adversarial surveillance.
266
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Of course, maybe the farmer in Shack had previously mistreated
his laborers in ways that the LSC attorney and the SCOPE field worker
had a right and responsibility to prevent. Still, given what Shack does
say, and given what later became known about LSC information-gathering techniques, the farmer's perceived interest is more significant
than the case or most commentary suggests. Henry Smith, by the way,
does not consider these possibilities, either, or how they might shape
the farmers' utility functions. 2 72 This omission suggests that Henry
Smith's indirect economic analysis is not entirely free of the utilityvaluation problems inherent in the Posnerian economic analysis he
2 73
criticizes.
That background helps clarify why Shack is so problematic as an
illustration of virtue theory in practice. First, virtue politics could easily make Shack and other similar confrontations more extreme. The
Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues both consider only two solutions to Shack exist: enforce rights theory to the benefit of the farm
owner, or use virtue theory to the benefit of the migrants and their
advocates. However, once theorists and judges let the virtue cat out of
the liberal bag, the migrants and their advocates will not be the only
parties appealing to virtue principles. As Alasdair Maclntyre has explained, every particular theory of virtue "claims not only theoretical,
but also an institutional hegemony" for the virtue at the top of its
theoretical pyramid. 274 In a virtue regime, the farmers would argue
that industry, attachment to the land, and other agricultural virtues
deserve to be the hegemonic virtues.
In practice, I am extremely skeptical that judges can distinguish
the virtuous and vicious in Solomon-like fashion often enough to
avoid the problems they will create. Land Virtues suggests that judges
may settle such disputes by applying 'justice,"275 but this suggestion
just reinforces my skepticism. Aristotle defines distributive justice as a
principle by which citizens enjoy the benefits of political society in
proportion to the extent to which they contribute to the society's common good. 2 76 I am puzzled how Land Virtues can conclude so confidently that the virtue of justice is on the side of the governmentfunded migrant advocates. The local control group could organize
the shared common political good around numerical equality, wealth,
breeding, intelligence, post-graduation education-or the farmerand laborer-specific criteria that make Shack so factious. All virtuefriendly theories establish an argument structure that presumes that
272
273
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the community's shared principles ofjustice can say which people and
interests are more virtuous than everyone else and their interests. In
practice, however, such theories do not help determine which virtues
are in fact the most virtuous. To make matters worse, they embolden
the winners and antagonize the losers.
Next, Shack's holding compresses the spheres of ethics and politics, and it confuses the distinctions between and the proper roles of
different virtues. I would say that the virtue that best justifies Shack's
holding is not 'Justice" but "charity." But that cannot be right, because charity is an ethical virtue, not a political one. As Robert
George explains, legally coerced charity is in an important sense not
really charity at all: "compelling the expressing of gratitude, or the
giving of gifts . . .where people ought to express gratitude [or] give

gifts... would have the effect of robbing these important practices of
their meaning and value in social life." 2 77 If, on the other hand, Shack

instead reflects 'justice," it conflates ethical justice, an actor's right
actions in his individual conduct in relation to others, whoever they
may be, with political justice, an actor's right action in relation to
other citizens. When justice is so conflated, we are not too far from
the rule of judicial philosopher-kings.
That theoretical confusion can have palpable practical consequences. Exclusive property rights facilitate social interactions. By establishing an owner as the gatekeeper, they let him establish relations
with the one person he chooses to let in through the gate and not
with the nine he prefers to exclude. 278 Such relations provide the
starting point for the mutual exercise of such basic virtues as commercial and political civility. Shack interferes with this process for establishing the virtues. One might say that Shack is different, because the
farm owner has already established social relations with the migrants,
which relations Shack merely seeks to equalize. 279 Such efforts, however, can also backfire, by signaling to owner-gatekeepers that they
might be better off without licensees who may insist on more intimate
social relations than the owners themselves want. In the 1980s and
1990s, a successful California fruit farmer custom-built $1.6 million in
duplex houses for 400 migrant workers. After California legal-services
lawyers sued him for overtime wages (worth $1,971.60), he tore down

277 GEORGE, supra note 91, at 44; accord POLITICS, supra note 40, 11.5, at 1263b11-14;
POLTICS (Lord trans.), supra note 40, at 61.
278 See PENNER, supra note 237, at 74-75.
279 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN.- L. REV. 611
(1988) (arguing that, when individuals rely on relations organized around property assets,
their reliance can grow into property interests in those assets).
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the structures to avoid leaving his business exposed as a target for fu28 0
ture lawsuits.
Finally, Shack can be understood not as an application of virtue
ethics but rather as an illustration of judicial hubris and self-deception. Imagine a situation in which a large boy takes a large coat belonging to a small boy and forces the small boy to take his small coat
in exchange. The example reinforces how porous 'justice" is as a political concept. The small boy has legal justice on his side, but the
large boy has translegal justice on his. Xenophon uses this example in
the Cyropaedia,28s however, to teach a deep lesson about the motivations of ambitious office-seekers. As a young boy, before he becomes
King of Persia, Cyrus sits in judgment over the two boys and judges
that the big boy actedjusdly. His tutor beats him because, in Persia, a
28 2
republic governed under the rule of law, justice means legal justice.
By sitting in judgment of his peers, Cyrus manifests a disposition to
wish that his peers be dependent not on the rule of law but on him, as
small children are to a patriarch. He is beaten because he uses translegal justice as a cover to advance ambitions that are tyrannical in a
republic. To complicate things, Cyrus is self-deceived. He may think
he genuinely loves perfect justice, but his "ways of justice subordinate
' 28 3
justice to his imperial enterprise."
Anyone who thinks that public officials can use prudence to steer
clear of the pitfalls of virtue politics needs to consider whether those
officials can withstand the self-deception Xenophon portrays in Cyrus.
As a matter of aretaic adjudication, maybe decisions like Shack display
prudence, equity, and other judicial virtues. Although Shack does depart from ordinary boundary rules, its rule of decision is not followed
elsewhere in trespass very often, and the "one off' protects a powerless
class of individuals and their lawyers. On the other hand, decisions
like Shack could also reflect a complicated tyrannical impulse. Judges
might think they are doing what is equitable and prudent. In reality,
however, maybe they are appealing to a perfectionist theory of politics
to restructure the law, to redistribute property, and ultimately to dispense justice in a manner encouraging all parties to become dependent on them. Of course, in cases like Shack, maybe judges who claim
only to be "following the law" are in reality favoring the existing power
structure-and deceiving themselves about their own motivations. But
if all factions may accuse their rivals of being self-deceived and tyran280 See Rael Jean Isaac, Who Funds the Left? The GOP,WALL ST. J., June 23, 1995, at Al4,
Lexis Nexis Academic.
281
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nical, it makes even more sense to marginalize virtue in law and
politics.
To be sure, the law and political leaders could diminish the possibility of judicial vice by passing general prophylactic legislation. The
least controversial response would be to create a public office for LSC,
SCOPE, and other government-funded advocates to meet potential
migrant-clients. More controversially, such legislation could regulate
the access of LSC lawyers and government-funded field workers to migrants on farmer property to certain regular hours. 284 Citizens follow
general laws more obediently than court orders they regard as the
products of the caprice of individual judges. 2 85 Here, prudence
would have to judge. The farmers, the government-funded advocates,
and migrant workers all have legitimate interests, but any of them may
use their legitimate interests as pretexts to disregard the interests of
the others. Prudence would also want to know whether legislation
made it up to farmers for their lost exclusivity rights by giving them
other legislative help (say, in farm assistance), or to migrants and their
advocates for lost access rights (say, with more migrant assistance).
These possibilities confirm that virtue theory can apply to disputes like
Shack and in a humane way. But applying it is quite complicated.
Among other things, note that the least controversial solutions provide charity to the migrants while respecting the property claims of
the farm owners. The state promotes public virtue, but without telling
owners that virtue requires them to sacrifice their own to the interests
of their rivals.
CONCLUSION

For far too long, utilitarian legal scholars have dismissed philosophical legal scholarship with a two-step trap: Kantian philosophy
may be ignored because it is too doctrinaire; and any other philosophical account of law may be ignored because it is incoherent. This trap
is overdrawn. The deontology trap does not apply to virtue ethics,
many theories of natural law or rights, or many other virtue-friendly
theories of practical philosophy. By dismissing these theories so
quickly, contemporary legal scholarship is cutting itself off from serious engagement with a wide range of prominent philosophical authorities written before the eighteenth century. The Social-Obligation
Norm and Land Virtues provide two model scholarly examples how not
to get bogged down in the deontology trap.
On the other hand, in virtue ethics and in political-philosophy
scholarship, scholars still regard it as an open and extremely impor284
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tant question whether the prescriptions of virtue ethics can be transplanted seamlessly from the field of ethics back to the field of politics.
This Response has sketched several reasons, persuasive in their own
right and prominent in the development of classical liberalism, why
this transplantation might not take. Because the modem world has
large nations, with populations made diverse by race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and ideology, a politics of virtue may be suicidaland a politics of property rights may be more humane. The more "virtue" is a dominant theme in property regulation, the less effective
"property" is in politics, as a liberal metaphor steering religious, ethnic, or ideological extremism out of the public square. Similarly, in
law, in cases like Shack, virtue principles may bring to the surface "culture war" overtones that are kept discreetly submerged by a rightsbased focus to property law.
This background does not totally undermine The Social-Obligation
Norm and Land Virtues' arguments. Virtue principles surely have a role
to play in traditional morals laws regulating property, and in filling
out the reciprocal obligations of people who have joint interests in a
single asset. But the background does complicate the lead articles'
story. If virtue theory deserves to be used in property law, it ought to
be used around the periphery and not at the core.
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